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Chechnya today has been operationalized as a hub of Islamic radicalism that 
threatens a global jihad force.  How did this region become a link in terrorist networks such 
as Al Qaeda?  And how did a Chechen nationalist movement transform into a jihad against 
Russia and the West?  Islamic radicalism in Post-Soviet Chechnya is the product of many 
factors, chief among them notions of historical determinism, a legacy of conflict and 
oppression, and political volatility.  Consequently, this report utilizes a historical and 
political approach in order to present a clear and complete understanding of Islamism’s rise 
and growth in Chechnya.  Russo-Chechen relations have long preceded today’s insurgency 
and counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya, and Islam has always played a crucial role 
in this history.  The Russo-Chechen narrative is thus key to understanding the development 
of Islamism in Chechnya.  Chapters 1 and 2 delineate this history and expound upon 
notions of historical determinism, helping to contextualize Islamism in contemporary 
Chechnya.  There are also a host of politically contingent factors contributing to Islamic 
radicalism in Chechnya, particularly Putin’s use of soft authoritarianism in the Caucasus.  
 vii 
These factors are examined in Chapter 3.  Taken in sum, this historico-political approach 
aims to trace the development of political Islam in Chechnya and shed light on the 
consequences of this phenomenon, as they relate to today’s growing network of global 
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Introduction 
Prior to the afternoon of April 15, 2013, few people in the United States could 
locate Chechnya on a map, much less articulate the region’s complex history of conflict 
and violence.  But following the eruption of terror after two pressure cooker bombs 
exploded during the Boston Marathon, everyone’s eyes were suddenly fixated on this tiny 
region, straddling Russia to the north, and the Caucasus Mountains to the south.1  The 
bombs exploded about twelve seconds and 190 meters apart, near the marathon's finish 
line, located on Boylston Street.  They killed three people and injured an estimated 264 
others.2  The guilty parties of the incident: two Chechen nationals who moved to the US 
approximately a decade before the tragedy.  The FBI immediately took on the case, and 
by April 18th, released photographs, identifying brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev as the men behind the bombings.  Fleeing from arrest, the Tsarnaev brothers 
eventually made it to Watertown, Massachusetts, 8.9 miles from Boston,3 shooting and 
killing an MIT policeman in the process.  Officials caught up to them in Watertown and a 
gunfight ensued, resulting in the death of elder brother, Tamerlan.  Dzhokhar escaped in a 
stolen SUV.  
1 "What we know about the Boston bombing and its aftermath,” CNN, April 19, 2013. 
2 Kotz, Deborah, ”Injury toll from Marathon bombs reduced to 264,” The Boston Globe, 
April 24, 2013. 
3 Map data © Google 2015 
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In an unprecedented manhunt, the entire city of Watertown up to a 20-block 
radius from the center was shut down.4  This situation was to be the first major field test 
for the national interagency security organizations established after the September 11th 
attacks.  American, as well as international, media reported almost exclusively on this 
story, and the hashtag #PrayForBoston quickly began trending, rapidly attaining millions 
of tweets and retweets on social media.  As the manhunt progressed, footage of utter 
chaos and fear in Boston was quickly replaced by eerie images of a desolate Watertown.  
America waited with bated breath for Dzhokhar’s capture, able only to sit in fear and 
watch as major news headlines provided hour-by-hour updates.  By nightfall, a 
Watertown resident had located Dzhokhar hiding in a boat in his backyard.  Authorities 
rushed to the scene.  Using thermal camera technology, they fired one shot, successfully 
wounding Tsarnaev.  He was detained without further incident.5  Claiming that elder 
brother Tamerlan was the criminal mastermind, Dzhokhar outlined during interrogation  
how the brothers were inspired by widely available literature on Islamic radicalism.  
Interrogation also revealed that they obtained the information to construct the two bombs 
online, using references supplied by the Islamic terrorist network, Al-Qaeda.6 
4 Tanfani, Joseph, Devin Kelly, and Michael Muskal, "Boston bombing [Update]: Door-to-
door manhunt locks down city," Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2013. 
5 Seelye, Katharine Q., Michael Cooper, and William K. Rashbaum, "Boston bomb 
suspect is captured after standoff," The New York Times, April 19, 2013. 
6 Cooper, Michael, Michael S. Schmidt, and Eric Schmidt, “Bombing Suspects are Seen 
as Self-taught and Fueled by Web,” The New York Times, April 23, 2013. 
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The Tsarnaev brother’s Patriots Day attack on Boylston Street placed Chechnya 
back in the international spotlight for the first time since the most recent ceasefire 
agreement in the gruesome Russo-Chechen Wars in 2010.  Claiming that they were 
acting as lone wolves, the Tsarnaev brothers admitted they were inspired by Islamist 
groups like Al-Qaeda, but did not act in conjunction with any known terrorist 
Figure 1, Political Map of Chechnya, courtesy of UT Austin PCL Map Collection 
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organization.7  While these types of lone-wolf terrorist attacks are difficult to detect and 
stop, they should come as no surprise to anyone who has studied Chechnya and its 
culture.  It is telling that American authorities described the attack as a “lone-wolf 
operation,”8 for it is none other than the wolf that is the enduring symbol of the Chechen 
people.  The wolf embodies all that it means to be a Chechen; the wolf is simultaneously 
a symbol of fierce independence, and pack loyalty.  The symbol of the wolf underscores 
an important facet of Chechen identity: the driving force that is cultural heritage and 
political culture.   According to popular consensus, the origins of the symbol of the wolf 
comes from the mythological "Wolf Mother" of Turpalo-Noxchuo, who birthed the 
Chechen people.   A central line of the Chechen national anthem alludes to this legend.  
But the wolf is more than a mythological symbol to Chechens; the wolf is exemplar of 
Chechen existence.  As Katherine S. Layton states, “every Chechen, regardless of 
political inclination or social status, knows the symbol of the wolf. The wolf is a 
multilayered and holistic representation of what it means to be Chechen.”9  The wolf 
embraces his primitive essentiality, and consequently, nature embraces the wolf.  At the 
same time the wolf is noble, hunting not the weak, but those creatures stronger than he.  
The lone wolf is an embodiment of independence, but is never fully alone.  He is an 
integral part of a larger community that endures nature’s tribulations collectively.  The 
7 Cooper, Michael, Michael S. Schmidt, and Eric Schmidt, “Bombing Suspects are Seen 
as Self-taught and Fueled by Web,” The New York Times, April 23, 2013. 
8 Sherman, Pat, "UCSD professor says Boston Marathon was ‘lone wolf’ terrorism,” La 
Jolla Light, April 21, 2013. 
9 Layton, Katherine S. Chechens: Culture and Society, pp. 62-63. 
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wolf thus encompasses what is essential to being Chechen: freedom, honor, and courage 
of conviction.  Indeed, the flag of the Republic of Ichkeria boasts the wolf at its center.  
After the outset of the Russo-Chechen wars, the wolf as a symbol was adopted by 
separatist Chechen militants as a form of ethos and to allude to their Chechen identity.     
The Chechens’ cultural narrative10 is replete with examples of banditry, revenge, 
and blood feuds.  Simultaneously, the Chechen political culture is a precarious one, in 
which a delicate balance exists between clan hierarchy and the official Chechen 
government.  Born into this complex culture, the separatists or “wolves” of Chechnya are 
raised in a climate of political volatility.  The Russo-Chechen Wars have only 
exacerbated this political unpredictability.  As Mark Galeotti notes in his publication on 
Chechen history, “A generation of Chechens is now reaching adulthood having known 
nothing but conflict and the messy, brutal counter-insurgency operations which followed 
the formal end of the war in 2009.”11  In many ways, the words and actions of the 
Tsarnaev brothers, influenced by their Chechen identity,12 reflect this recent experience of 
10 As a point of clarification, the Chechens’ cultural narrative is subject to differences in 
interpretation depending on who is writing, or reading, the narrative.  Here, I mean 
Chechens’ cultural narrative about themselves, though many elements endemic to their 
own cultural narrative is carried over into cultural narratives given by non-Chechens.  
11 Galeotti, Mark. Essential Histories: Russia’s Wars in Chechnya, 1994-2009, p. 8. 
12 To what extent their Chechen heritage drove the interests of the Tsarnaev brothers 
remains suspect, however social media profiles such as VKontakte, and searches of 
their personal computers’ internet history indicate that the brothers were following the 
affairs of Chechnya and were attuned to Chechen politics.  For a discussion of the 
Tsarnaev brothers’ link to Chechnya and how Chechen culture could have influenced 
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, see Thomas Goltz, “Is There A Chechen Connection 
to the Boston Bombings?”, The Nation, April 24, 2013, as well as, Miriam Elder and Matt 
Williams, “Chechnya connections build picture of Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev,” The
Guardian, April 19, 2013.  
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violence and upheaval.  However, in employing strategic tactics of jihad13, the Tsarnaev 
brothers have added Islamic radicalism to the equation. 
Born out of the first Russo-Chechen War (1994-1996) and then-president of 
Chechnya Dzhokhar Dudaev’s political and military incompetence, the presence of 
Islamism has influenced the wolves of Chechen nationalism, and transformed them into 
cogs in the wheels of a global jihadist network.  I would like to pause here to explain 
what is meant by Islamism.  Islamism is an ideology, distinct from the religion that 
provides its namesake.  As Daniel Pipes states, Islamism stresses “complete adherence to 
the sacred law of Islam and rejects as much as possible outside influence, with some 
exceptions (such as access to military and medical technology).  It is imbued with a deep 
antagonism towards non-Muslims and has a particular hostility towards the West.  It 
amounts to an effort to turn Islam, a religion and civilization, into an ideology.”14  
Underlying current Islamic radicalism in Chechnya is a centuries-old struggle for 
independence from Russia.  The Chechen separatist movement has historically been one 
of defiance against central authority, in which Islam was used as a mechanism for uniting 
13 Most broadly, the term jihad is defined as a holy war against the non-Muslims of dar 
al-harb, or “house of war.”  As defined by Moshe Gammer, Muslim legal literature (fiqh) 
distinguishes between an offensive jihad (to conquer parts of dar al-harb), which is the 
obligation and responsibility of the ruler, and a defensive jihad when a part of dar al-
Islam is attacked and conquered by unbelievers.  In the case of a defensive jihad, 
participation in the jihad is an obligation of all able Muslims in the attacked area.  I use 
Gammer’s definition of a jihad, as a holy war or effort broadly; I will not distinguish 
explicitly between defensive or offensive jihad, though such a distinction may be gleaned 
from context.  
14For more on the definition of Islamism, see Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing between 
Islam and Islamism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 30, 1998, also, 
Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. 2004.  
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the fragmented, hierarchical clan-based Chechen peoples in a common cause.  But the 
establishment of ties between Chechnya and Islamic radical groups, such as Al Qaeda, 
has led to the addition of terrorism and tactics of jihad to the Chechen separatist 
movement.  Consequently, Chechnya is now linked to a global jihad network.  In this 
manner, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev represent a grim reality for residents of 
Grozny, Moscow, and Boston alike: Chechnya has been operationalized as a center of 
Islamism.  And the Chechen militant revolutionary network has not only penetrated 
deeper into Russia, but has begun to extend its operations to the West, threatening a 
global jihad force.     
This report provides a critical presentation of the rise of Islamism in Chechnya, 
and how it has come to replace Chechen nationalist efforts in the region.  Chapter 1 
provides a brief history of Chechen separatism and the rise of Islamic extremism in 
Russia eventuating in today’s jihad movement in the region.  Any analysis of Islamism in 
Chechnya requires an understanding of Chechnya’s long-standing legacy of political 
precariousness and conflict with Russia.  Chapters 2 and 3 offer a concise analysis of the 
social, cultural, and political environment in Chechnya that have made the country 
conducive to Islamism becoming a dominant force driving current politics and conflict.  
In order to approach the issue in a thorough and multi-causal manner, my examination of 
the causes of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya consists of two parts.  First, Chapter 2, 
discusses historical precipitators of radicalism, as extant literature widely speaks to the 
role of history in the Chechen quagmire.  Such a historical explanation for the 
increasingly radical ideology in Chechnya are not all-encompassing, but are compelling; 
8 
this explanation offers insight into the Russo-Chechen conflict, as well as Islamism’s role 
in this conflict.  Specifically, I examine how a determinist reading of history has 
contributed to the radicalization of Chechen separatism.  Second, Chapter 3 draws 
inspiration from Chechnya specialist Gordon Hahn’s system theory model for explaining 
Islamic radicalism in Chechnya.  Hahn stresses the need for a multi-layered approach to 
understanding the rise of Islamism in Chechnya.  Building upon this notion of complex 
causality, Chapter 3 provides a succinct analysis of various structural, and operational, or 
politically contingent, factors contributing to the presence and proliferation of Islamism 
in the Chechen state.  I conclude with a discussion of the future implications of Chechen 
jihadism and Islamism’s tenacity in Chechnya. 
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Chapter 1  Chechnya: A Brief History  
По камням струится Терек, 
Плещет мутный вал; 
Злой чечен ползет на берег, 
Точит свой кинжал; 
Но отец твой старый воин, 
Закален в бою: 
Спи, малютка, будь спокоен, 
     Баюшки-баю. —Казачья Колыбельная Песня, М. Лермонтов 
“The Terek runs over its rocky bed. 
And splashes its dark wave,  
A sly brigand crawls along the bank; 
Sharpening his dagger’ while in the song the Cossack mother reassures her child that 
‘your father is an old warrior; hardened in battle.”  —M. Lermontov, Cossack Lullaby 
A.   Early Russo-Chechen Relations  
Largely due to geography, the region of the North Caucasus has a complicated and rich 
history. The Northern Caucasus lies at a critical junction between trade routes and 
consequently, has, at times, been the intersection at which civilizations of the West and 
East either mingled, or clashed.  In many ways, current Russian-Chechen tensions are an 
extension of a historical legacy of conflict.  The origins of this conflict lie in differences 
of cultural perception.  In the nineteenth century, Russians conceptualized Chechens as a 
curious mixture of a primitive yet respected people, the archetypal “noble savages” of 
Western colonialism.  Classical Russian literature is replete with examples of work 
depicting the contradictory and enigmatic Chechens.  Mikhail Lermontov’s Cossack 
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Lullaby for example, speaks to this image of the Chechen gortsy, or mountain people,15 as 
“wily,” and “primitive” but also “respectable.”16  Pushkin’s “The Caucasus Prisoner” 
romanticizes and underscores the raw beauty and wild nature of the Caucasus Mountains 
and her people.17  Lermontov famously wrote much about the Caucasus.  In his poem 
“Mtsyri,” he tells the story of a young Caucasus highland boy who is left in a Georgian 
monastery.  As he grows older, he comes to realize his gortsy identity: “And through the 
mist I saw at times / How unassailable in snows, / The Caucasus in glory rose… / And 
from my half-forgotten past / a misty veil was dropped at last.”18  As Charles King states 
in his The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus, “the poem [Mtsyri] contains a 
harsh rebuke of Russian atrocities in its highland wars [in the Caucasus].”19  But while 
Pushkin and his contemporary, Lermontov, wrote Romantically about the primitive 
freedom of the Caucasians, Russia was ultimately perceived by Russians as the purveyor 
of civilization to the region, and the great writers of the time considered the Chechen 
campaigns such as those of A.P. Ermolov to be a historical necessity.20  As a British 
officer traveling through Chechnya in the 1850s notes, 
“The Caucasian character has all the good and evil features common amongst 
semi-savage mountaineers.  Possessed of the most daring courage … frugal and 
15 In Lermontov’s time, the term Cossack was used indiscriminately to distinguish 
inhabitants of the Caucasus mountain range, which included the Chechens. 
16 Galeotti, Mark. Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, p. 14. 
17 Fowkes, Ben. Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis, p. 26. 
18 King, Charles. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus, pp. 114-115. 
19 King, Charles. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus, pp. 114-115. 
20 H. Troyat, Pushkin, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 168-74, quoted in Ben 
Fowkes (ed.), Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis, p. 26. 
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temperate in their ordinary habits; honorable and affectionate in their domestic 
relations; they are, nevertheless, to an enemy, or, indeed, to an outsider of any 
kind, both ruthless and bloodthirsty, seeming to be actuated by but two motives 
— love of bloodshed and love of gain.”21  
The Russians have historically conceived of the Chechens as “wily and primitive.”  This 
perception, in tandem with centuries of Chechen oppression based on fear of Islamic 
dominance over Russian Eastern Orthodoxy, has largely contributed to a complex 
conflict.  As stated by Simone Ipsa-Landa, “The conflicts in Chechnya have therefore 
become like a Rorschach test of Russians’ identity aspirations, with the very accusations 
of bribery and banditry that the West levels against Russia being displaced onto 
Chechens.”22  Russo-Chechen conflict has always been about the Russian perception of 
the Chechens as ‘other.’  Chechnya’s long history with Islam has helped contribute to 
this difference in perception.  There is a tendency to romanticize descriptions of 
Caucasian people as exotic, in an orientalist sense, but ultimately backwards and “lesser.”
Chechnya has long been a region on the periphery of Moscow.  The Caucasus, it would 
seem, breeds its own distinct culture, due to its liminal geographical location, nestled 
within the Caucasus mountains, and the traditions of the mountain people inhabiting it.  
This difference in perception stands as a backdrop to Russo-Chechen relations.   
21 Fawn, Rick and Stephen White, Russia After Communism, pp. 86-89 
22 Ipsa-Landa, Simone. “Russian Preferred Self-Image and the Two Chechen Wars.”
Demokratizatsiya, p. 315.  
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Though Russian Cossack23 communities in search of independence from central 
Tsarist authority began settling the Caucasus mountains of Russia as early as the 
sixteenth century, most Russian encounters with the mountaineer peoples began in the 
eighteenth century.24  It was the Russian campaign against Sheikh Mansur, beginning in 
1784, that brought Chechnya to the forefront of Russia’s domestic concerns.  The 
struggle against Mansur threatened to become a trans-Caucasian issue, thereby opening 
the door to conflict with the neighboring Ottoman Empire, Russia’s primary rival at the 
time.  Followers of Sufi-educated25 Sheikh Mansur supported the universal adoption of 
sharia, or Islamic law, over the Chechen adat, a set of traditional customs that acts as a 
legal code, and proposed a ghazavat, or Holy War, in the entire Northern Caucasus.26  
Mansur called for a return to an “ascetical and purified Islam,” and criticized widespread 
practices such as theft, the cult of the dead, and the practice of vendetta.27  Initially this 
holy war was to be waged against ‘corrupt Muslims,’ those Muslims who did not 
acknowledge the dominance of sharia law, and consequently, his own authority.  Under 
the banner of Islamic unity, Mansur demanded “faith in God” and “order” throughout the 
23 Not to be confused with the Cossacks of Lermontov’s Cossack Lullaby. 
24 This is not to say there were not encounters prior to the 18th century; for example, 
skirmishes during the time of Peter the Great, during the Safavid Iran campaign, are 
among the first reported instances of the Chechens’ demonstrating their tenacity and 
ferocity as mountainous guerillas.   
25 Sufism is a mystical Islamic belief and practice in which Muslims seek to find the truth 
of divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a 
variety of mystical paths that are designed to ascertain the nature of humanity and of 
God and to facilitate the experience of the presence of divine love and wisdom in the 
world, Encyclopedia Britannica 
26 In this report, the words jihad and ghazavat are often used interchangeably 
27 Dunlop, John B.  Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflic,. pp. 11-
12 
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villages of Chechnya.28  But upon hearing that Mansur intended to invade the neighboring 
Caucasus republic of Kabardia, Imperial Russia deployed the Astrakhan Regiment to 
Chechnya to quell the ghazavat before it happened.29  As Mark Galeotti outlines, the 
Russian government feared such a jihad could easily snowball into a holy war between 
Mansur and the Ottoman Empire, and all of Orthodox Russia.30  The Northern 
Caucasians, especially the Chechens, stubbornly resisted such Russian imperialist 
campaigns however, and fought fiercely for their freedom against the armies of the tsar.31  
In this oppositionist struggle, the Chechens embraced a curious mixture of Islam-proper, 
and traditional beliefs, resulting in a quasi-religion that, while far from radical or even 
conservative in its adherence to the teachings of the Koran, nonetheless became an 
integral part of shared Chechen identity.  
The Astrakhan Regiment, initially dispatched to Sheikh Mansur’s home village of 
Aldy, set fire to the town after finding it empty.  This action served only to enrage the 
Chechens and empowered Mansur with the rhetoric needed to extend the ghazavat 
against the Russians.  While it would not be until the Soviet period that Chechen national 
identity, in the modern sense of statehood, was fully realized, a strong sense of ethno-
nationalism was present during Mansur’s time.  Islam provided a uniting ideology under 
which Mansur could rally and operationalize the Chechens in fighting Russian forces.  
28 Bliev, M. M., and V. V. Degoev. Kavkazskaya voina, p. 134. 
29 Dunlop, John B.  Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. pp. 11-
12. 
30 Galeotti, Mark. Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, p. 14. 
31 Fowkes, Ben (ed.). Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis.  
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But the core cause of early Russo-Chechen conflict was hardly a question of religion.  
Many Chechens opposed the adoption of sharia law, which in many instances directly 
contradicted the Chechen adat.  The adat is rooted in ancient tribal codes of behavior that 
precede and often take preponderance over Islamic mandates, and in many instances, 
clash with shariah law.  One such example is the Chechen cultural legacy of blood feuds.  
The Koran specifically forbids the spilling of innocent blood, and therefore comes into 
conflict with Chechen notions of revenge and inter-teip, or clan, killing in the name of 
crimes committed in past generations.32  Anatoly Lieven gives a good example of this in 
one of his personal memoirs in which he meets and interviews a German-turned-Muslim 
living in Chechnya.  Wilhelm Weisserth, who returned to Chechnya in 1957 after visiting 
Mecca and becoming an Islamic scholar and leader, became an elder in his Chechen 
wife’s village.  Wilhelm describes the complex role of village leader and religious leader: 
One problem for the elders is of course the question of revenge.  In the Chechen 
tradition (Adat), if a member of your family is killed or wounded, you have the 
right of revenge.  There was a case in the mountains, resolved this year, where 
members of a family got drunk and beat another man while stealing his car, and 
he died.  The blood-feud went on for twenty-three years.  The Soviet law gave the 
men ten years in gaol, but when they were released it began again.  But the 
32 A quick note about the Chechen teip-system: Society was divided along patrilineal 
lines, into extended families (dözal or tsa’ in Chechen), clans (gar or neq’i), tribes (teip) 
and tribal confederations (tuqum).  This system of societal classification served as a 
locus of identity, around which political, social, and economic structures were 
constructed, Gammer, Moshe. The Lone Wolf and the Bear, p. 4.  
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Shariat lays down quite different rules, it absolutely  forbids revenge against 
innocent relations — though many Chechens don’t know that, or don't want to…
We religious leaders appeal to the Koran, tell people that Allah does not allow 
murder, whatever the reason.  But when trouble has occurred, then our task is to 
reconcile the parties so that it doesn’t spread, and to bring forgiveness.33 
The teip leader, or tribe elder, has the difficult the role of mediator, and must act as a 
source of authority in settling such disputes.  But where to place authority: in the 
teachings of Islam or in Chechen traditions of blood-feud?  In this manner, Islam and 
Chechen culture are often divided.  Nonetheless, years of conflict with the Motherland 
and centuries of Russian oppression provided reason enough for the Chechen gortsy, or 
mountaineers, to stand behind Mansur and his Islamic ideology, all sharing a common 
enemy in Russia. 
In 1785, at the Sunzha River crossing the Russians returning from Aldy were 
ambushed and massacred; as many as six hundreds Russians were killed, one hundred 
captured, and the entirety of the Astrakhan regiment dissolved.34  Surviving soldiers, 
escaping into the surrounding forests, were hunted and killed.  Emboldened by this initial 
success, Mansur rallied fighters from within Chechnya and across the Caucasus.  A gifted 
rhetorician and charismatic leader, a hallmark of Chechen religious leaders, Mansur 
easily mobilized 12,000 fighters, most of whom were Chechen.  However, Mansur’s 
expertise as a leader stands in contrast to his military acumen; attempting to conquer the 
33 Lieven, Anatol. 1998. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, pp. 29-30. 
34 Baddely, John. Russian Conquest, p. 49 
16 
Kizlyar fortress, Mansur’s forces made the mistake of crossing into Russian territory and 
were easily defeated.  As John B. Dunlop discusses in his book Russia Confronts 
Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Mansur’s decisive victory over the Russian 
forces at the Sunzha River crossing “led [him] into overconfidence, and prompted him to 
undertake certain ill-advised military actions.”35  In July of 1785, Mansur traveled down 
from the mountains and marched upon the Kizlyar fortress, located near the Terek River.  
Three days of intense fighting ensued, but Mansur failed to capture the garrison, whose 
superior artillery proved to be a decisive factor in repelling Mansur and his forces.  
Though Sheikh Mansur escaped and remained active until his capture in 1791, his 
campaign had failed.  But in challenging the Russians, his early success at the Sunzha 
Pass and his ability to rally thousands of fighters sent a clear signal to the Russians that 
the Chechens were a formidable adversary when united.  Under the banner of Islam, their 
ferocity of spirit was matched only by their skills as guerrilla militants.  
The next century would see General Alexei Yermolov’s campaign to secure a 
road running through Chechnya to Georgia, annexed in 1801.  Georgia was foremost a 
buffer between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and Imperial Russia was keen on having 
Georgia as an ally.  Conversely, Christian Georgia, being surrounded by Muslim lands, 
sought protection from the Tsar from the neighboring Ottomans.36  The proposed road to 
35 Dunlop, John B.  Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, pp. 11-
12. 
36 Dunlop, John B.  Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict, pp. 13. 
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Georgia would also aid in bolstering defenses against Iran and the Ottoman Empire.37  
The construction of this path meant again engaging with the fierce Chechen 
mountaineers.  This time, Yermolov would ensure that Russian policy towards 
Chechnya’s civil population was ruthless, adopting a “scorched earth” policy.38  He 
himself stated, “I desire that the terror of my name shall guard our frontiers more potently 
than the chains of the fortresses.”39  Yermolov was especially wary of the Chechens, 
whom he regarded as a ‘bold and dangerous people.’40  The fortress of Grozny, loosely 
translated as “dread” in Russian, was founded in 1818 thanks to Yermolov.  Yermolov 
aimed to contain the Chechens in the mountains, clearing the lowlands between the Terek 
and Sunzha Rivers for Cossack settlers.  These Cossacks would in turn cut down the 
forests, in an attempt to dissolve the Chechen advantage.  The Chechens responded by 
calling a meeting of the teips, or clans, to rally against the Russians.  Yermolov countered 
the Chechen response quickly, driving the Chechens back into the highlands.  But the 
Chechens, though suffering some losses, were far from defeated.  This conflict continued 
until 1827, at which time Yermolov was recalled and removed as head of the Chechen 
campaign.  But his hardline policy against the Chechens was continued by his successors, 
albeit “with less ruthless enthusiasm.”41  The Russians, with the help of Yermolov, 
                                                   
37 For a thorough discussion of Russo-Georgian relations, see Donald Rayfield, Edge of 
Empires: A History of Georgia (Reaktion Books, 2012) 
38 Sakwa, Richard. “Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya.” In Chechnya: From 
Past to Future, p. 27.  
39 Baddely, John. Russian Conquest, p. 97. 
40 Galeotti, Mark. Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1996-2009, p. 14. 
41 Galeotti, 15 
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defined and dominated Russo-Chechen relations in the eighteenth century.  But with the 
advent of the nineteenth century and the rise of Sheikh Mansur’s successor, Imam 
Shamil, it would be the Chechen gortsy who would challenge Russia in the next phase of 
conflict. 
Just as Mansur was but one in a long line of charismatic, religious leaders who 
would unite the mountaineer peoples in common antagonism to central authorities in 
Petersburg (and later in Moscow), Imam Shamil, too, was a cultural hero and religious 
figure who raised Chechnya and the North Caucasus in rebellion.  Imam Shamil, a 
Dagestani Muslim, would become de facto leader of the Chechen gortsy and Chechen 
resistance movement in the nineteenth century.  Shamil took up the resistance movement 
of the North Caucasus in 1834.  Initially, he tried to reach a rapprochement with Russia.42  
In exchange for a greater degree of political autonomy, Shamil agreed on behalf of the 
Chechen to accept Imperial Russia’s supreme sovereignty and to cease the bloody raids 
in the Caucasus lowlands.  Russia rejected any thought of compromise, fearing the 
Chechens and their warfare expertise.  As one Russian officer at the time phrased it, 
“amidst their forests and mountains, no troops in the world could afford to despise them” 
for they were “good shots, fiercely brave [and] intelligent in military affairs.”43   
Ultimately Shamil, though being gifted with greater political and military aptitude 
than Mansur and his predecessors, would also fail in his struggle against the tremendous 
force of the Russian Empire.  But Shamil continued the practice of Chechen guerrilla 
42 Galeotti, 15 
43 ibid. 
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warfare, as well as the use of Islam as a device for uniting teip-defined, egalitarian 
Chechen communities.  Under Imperial Russian rule, the Chechens fought reprisal after 
reprisal.  When Chechen hopes that the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and the ensuing 
instability, would help facilitate Chechen independence proved unfounded, the Chechens 
further united and rose up against the nascent Soviet Regime, becoming a worthy foe in 
future decades.   
B. Bolsheviks meet Chechnya 
The Bolsheviks created the Chechen autonomous oblast in November 1920, after several 
years of conflict with the anti-Bolshevik, or White, forces during the Russian Civil War, 
from 1918-1922.  Though a Union of the Peoples of the North Caucasus was established 
in 1917, and Chechnya’s independence was formally declared in 1918, General Anton 
Denikin of the White Guard and his forces clashed with the Chechens.  Ultimately 
Denikin and his forces were defeated and forced to retreat from the “seething volcano” of 
Chechnya.44  However, the arriving Bolshevik Army, initially greeted as liberators, soon 
proved to be interested only in continuing the oppressive policies of their Tsarist 
predecessors in Chechnya.  In 1934, Chechnya was merged with the Ingush autonomous 
oblast to form a joint Chechen-Ingush autonomous region, which was designated a 
republic two years later. During World War II, Stalin accused the Chechens and Ingush 
of collaboration with the Germans.  As a result, both groups were subjected to mass 
44 These were the words used by General Anton Denikin to describe the fierce Chechen 
territory after his defeat in 1920. 
 20 
deportations to Central Asia, and the republic of Checheno-Ingushetia proper was 
dissolved.  Historian Robert Conquest described these deportations as “one of the most 
significant, and most neglected episodes in modern history.”45  The first public reference 
to the deportations came in June 1946.  The paper Izvestia published a decree titled “On 
the Abolition of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and the Conversion of the Crimean ASSR 
into the Crimean Region (oblast).  This decree formally accused the Chechens and Ingush 
of aiding the German forces: 
“During the period of the Great Patriotic War, when the peoples of the USSR 
were heroically defending the honor and independence of their motherland in the 
struggle against the German Fascist occupiers, many Chechens and Crimean 
Tatars, under the instigation of agents of the Germans, entered into volunteer 
detachments organized by the Germans, and together with the German military 
forces conducted an armed struggle against detachments of the Red Army.”46 
As Conquest points out, despite these accusations, the German army barely set foot in 
Checheno-Ingushetia.47  It is generally accepted that Stalin’s claims against the Chechens 
are unsubstantiated.  The exiles were later allowed to return to their homeland, and the 
republic was reestablished under Nikita Khrushchev in 1957.  However, there were 
inexplicable psychological and social consequences.  Returning Chechens often brought 
with them a loathing towards Russia.  As Ben Fowkes writes, “psychologically, the 
                                                   
45 Conquest, Robert. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, p. ix.  
46 William Flemming, in Fowkes, Ben (ed.). Russia and Chechenia: The Permanent 
Crisis, pp. 66-67. 
47 Ibid.  
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experience of deportation led to a complete rejection of the Soviet system by the 
deportees.”48  Chechen exile Abdourahman Avtorkhanov expressed the anti-Russian 
sentiment felt by returning Chechen deportees in an interview in 1991 regarding the 
Chechen drive from independence: “It is a revolt of the children in revenge for the deaths 
of their fathers and mothers in deportation and exile.”49  This sentiment, in addition to a 
strong cultural heritage of revenge and feuding, fomented decades of fighting in years to 
come. 
Just as this legacy of Russo-Chechen conflict forms a historical continuum 
between Chechnya and Russia, Russian perception of Islam and its role in society also 
demarcated a recurring theme of Russo-Chechen history.  During Tsarist Russia, Islam 
was viewed as a potential threat to Orthodox Russia’s distinct role within Christendom 
and European civilization.  Russia, indubitably a product of her unique and variable 
geography, has traditionally maintained a kind of hegemonic strength in lieu of its 
strategic position straddling Europe to the West and Asia to the East.  Islam however, 
presented a viable challenge to this hegemony.  Moreover, the spread of Islam, much like 
Christianity, has been historically aggressive.  In order to maintain its tenacity within the 
Eurasian landmass, and to keep the Islamist Persian and Ottoman Empires at bay, Holy 
Russia had to subordinate Islam and tame its growth.  The various territories conquered 
and annexed by the Holy Russian Empire, particularly the Muslim khanates found along 
the Volga, in Siberia and, later, in Central Asia, had to be safeguarded against Islamist 
48 Fowkes, pp. 10-11. 
49 Literaturnia Gazeta, no. 43 (1991), p. 2. 
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empires that could undermine the territorial and cultural integrity of the Romanov 
Empire.  
Islam was thus enfeebled and oppressed throughout the Russian Empire, and by 
the Second World War, despite intermittent gestures of rapprochement by the early 
Bolsheviks, Islam was eliminated as a dominant force.  The only enduring pockets of 
Islamic practice were in the inaccessible mountains of the Northern Caucasus and Central 
Asia.  It was not until the threat of fascism and Nazi Germany that the Soviets were 
forced to address religious communities and minorities in Russia, lest they lose the 
loyalty of a host of direly-needed communities in the war effort.  As a result, the Soviet 
leadership not only made amends with the Orthodox Church, they also recreated the 
Muslim Spiritual Directorates.50 In Imperialist Russia, Catherine the Great established the 
Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly in 1788.51  Such assemblies were intended to 
allow the central Russian government to monitor and control Muslim religious activity.  
By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, only one directorate remained active, 
the original Orenburg Assembly, which was later renamed as the Central Spiritual 
Directorate of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia (TsDUM52).53 A handful of 
directorates were established in the 1920s during the nascent Soviet Union, but suffice it 
to say that only TsDUM and two other directorates, one of which was for the Muslim’s of 
the North Caucasus, continued to operate by 1943. 
50 Ro’i, Yaakov. Islam in the CIS, p. 1. 
51 Central Muslim Spiritual Board, http://cdum.ru/en/cdum/ 
52 TsDUM was again renamed in 1948 to DUMES 
53 Ro’i, Yaakov, p. 7 
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These directorates were, on the one hand, a sign of political cooperation between 
the surviving Islamist communities of Russia and the Soviet Union.  On the other hand, 
many Muslims in these communities viewed the establishment of such directorates as 
subjugation by the central authorities.  Furthermore, the Muslim leaders of these 
directorates were considered collaborators with a regime that for years had repressed and 
actively waged war against Islamist communities.  In this manner, an unforgivable 
grudge developed against so-called establishment Islam and non-establishment ‘parallel’ 
Islam.54  This schism highlights an underlying truth to Islam in Russia - the solution to 
Islamic radicalism today lies within Islam.  The inter-Islam factionalization that began 
under the Soviet Union in many ways continues to contribute to the strength of Islamic 
radicalism and Salafism55 in the Caucasus.  
Despite the best efforts of Soviet authorities and the establishment of such 
directorates, traditional, or “folk,” Islam remained the dominant form of religious culture 
within Chechnya and the greater Caucasus.  As Yaakov Ro’i points out, “…the weight of 
popular or folk Islam was in many regions clearly preponderant.  Its leaders, Sufi ishans 
in Central Asia and the mentors of Sufi wirds in the Caucasus, continued to enjoy much 
prestige among their followers.  This applied especially to rural regions… The 
repositories of Islam there… retained a semi-religious character and that no communist 
propaganda or government repression was able to eliminate.”56  A blend of local Muslim 
54 Ro’i, Yaakov, p. 2 
55 A movement for return to the golden age of Islam’s first four khalifs 
56 Ro’i, Yaakov, p. 2 
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shrines and pagan social celebrations, which no communist propaganda or Soviet 
repression was able to eliminate, dominated.  The few surviving directorates, 
supplemented by periodic monitoring of trends among Russia’s various Muslim 
communities, the Soviet regime largely turned a blind eye to Islamist communities in the 
Caucasus.  It would not be until Khruschev’s and Brezhnev’s regimes, during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, that Soviet authorities again began to treat Muslim communities as a 
threat to the stability of the Soviet Union.  During the 1960s and early 1970s some 
“extremist” Muslims began adopting “anti-Soviet” or “anti-social” positions, demanding 
the abolition of equality of rights for women and calling upon believers to refuse to serve 
in the Soviet armed forces or to let their children join the Young Pioneers or the 
Komsomol.57  For clarification, the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol were Party 
organizations for the Soviet youth.  These organizations were fundamental in teaching 
Soviet children Party doctrine, and were a source of legitimacy that demarcated “true” 
Party children and those who were “class enemies.”58  
 In tandem with liberalization and the continued “thaw” in the Soviet Union, the 
1970s also saw a series of events in Iran and Afghanistan that drastically affected Soviet 
policy towards Islam.  The rise of the Khomeini regime in Iran, committed to the 
dissemination of Islamic propaganda in the USSR, and the adoption of a new, anti-
Marxist-Leninist position by the mujahideen in Afghanistan, foreshadowed a revival of 
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Islamism in Russia’s Muslim regions.  Particularly susceptible was Russia’s Northern 
Caucasus, where Chechnya, long-considered the most polarized, religiously-oriented of 
all of the Soviet Union’s Muslim ethnic regions, was located.  This perception is curious, 
as it was not until 1978 that plans for the first mosque in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR were 
officially drafted, and it would not be until 1979 that this mosque was officially 
registered.59 
The threat of intransigent centers of Soviet Islam, specifically in Dagestan, 
Central Asia, and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, between 1981 and 1987, motivated the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee to set a historic 
precedent.  The CPSU began issuing a series of resolutions addressing Islam in the Soviet 
Union.  These resolutions included several countermeasures to combat Islam’s power and 
curb its expansion.  Islam was considered a dangerous challenge to stability.60  As 
Yaakov Ro’i describes, the threat of Islam to the stability of the Soviet Union was not the 
official CPSU apologia, but the perception of such a threat indubitably had an effect on 
the leadership’s decision making.61  Gorbachev’s speech to the Uzbekistan CP Central 
Committee in November 1986 is testament to this fact.  In the speech, Gorbachev stated 
that Islam was no longer in the category of a mere religion, but had “taken on a political 
59 Broxup, Marie. Islam and Atheism in the North Caucasus, pp. 40-48. 
60 Ro’i, Yaakov, pp. 2-3 
61 Ibid.  
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substance in a country where the sole permitted political institution was the CPSU.  A 
condition of war existed thereafter between Islam and the Soviet government.”62 
Islamist developments under Khruschev reached their apogee during Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s reign in the late 1980s.  Gorbachev maintained the hardline CPSU stance 
against Islam on the grounds that it threatened to undermine the USSR.  The extent of his 
views on the issue are evident by a speech he made in November 1986, just one year after 
taking office.  The speech, delivered to the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, argued 
that Islam was “no longer in the category of a mere religion, which entailed in itself a 
danger to the ruling ideology, but had taken on political substance in a country where the 
sole permitted political institution was the CPSU.”63  For all intents and purposes, this 
statement marked the start of a new war between the Soviet authorities and Islam. 
C. Gorbachev and Islam 
When Mikhail S. Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in March 1985, he endeavored to lead his country in a radically new 
direction, launching dramatic new programs, perestroika, or economic, social, and 
political restructuring, and glasnost, or the creation of an atmosphere of open expression 
and self-criticism.  These programs introduced profound changes in economic practice, 
internal affairs, and international relations. Within five years, Gorbachev’s programs 
62 Speech entitled Islam and Politics, Igor Believe, “Islam i politika”, Literaturnaia gazette, 
13 and 20 May 1987 
63 Ro’i, p. 3 
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proved revolutionary.  While his program of reform was not the only factor, nor the 
intention, it removed communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans from power and brought an end to the Cold War.  However, Gorbachev also 
unwittingly set the stage for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Perestroika and glasnost set in motion a wave of calls for sovereignty and a 
number of applications for official registration on behalf of groups and organizations, 
including some which were religious in nature.  The profound cultural transformation 
taking place towards the end of the Soviet period also affected the country’s Muslim 
communities.  Though ultimately, Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus was at the forefront 
of Soviet domestic concerns, the liberalization under Gorbachev did allow for a greater 
degree of autonomy for Russia’s Muslim populations.  Religious education was now 
possible, some journals such as Ogonek, a popular culture publication, began publishing 
articles underscoring Muslim viewpoints and apologia, and it was now possible to build 
new mosques in larger numbers, as restrictions on their registration diminished (or were 
altogether ignored).  Whereas Soviet practice prior to this cultural transformation was to 
disregard and quiet Muslim movements, these movements had now achieved a level of 
legitimacy.  As Yaakov Ro’i describes it, 
Demonstrations and disturbances became more commonplace — a few had 
occurred before, such as the anti-Russian demonstrations that had followed a 
soccer match at Pakhtakor stadium in Tashkent in 1969 and rocked the Uzbek 
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elite.  But now they were larger, more frequent and, above all, documented, for it 
was no longer possible to sweep them under the carpet.64   
Perhaps the most salient example of Islamic assertion of authority under Gorbachev is the 
creation of an entirely new group, the Islamic Revival Party (IRP), which called for the 
defense of Muslim rights.  Their agenda outlined the need to regulate the economy on the 
basis of Shari’a law, Muslim law as defined by the Qu’ran, and condemned ‘ideas of 
national specificity,’65 and declared that all Muslims of the Soviet Union were united as 
one umma, or one Islamic consociation.  An excerpt from their platform expresses these 
ideas: 
We, Muslims of different nationalities and regions, and of different madhhabs, 
have resolved to unite in a single Islamic Revival Party with the purpose of 
disseminating  Islam, consolidating the ties between all the Muslim peoples [of 
the Soviet Union], protecting the rights of Muslims at all levels, raising the 
political awareness of the Muslim masses, and defending their economic and 
other interests.66       
The IRP also condemned the practice of ‘extremism, terrorism and all forms of 
discrimination, kindling interethnic dissension and introducing martial law in the Muslim 
regions.’67  The condemnation of extremism and terrorism were directed at the Soviet 
authorities, though they established statutorily a code of conduct that applied within 
64 Ro’i, Yaakov, p. 4 
65 ‘Programma i ustav Islamskoi Partii Vozrozhdeniia’, n.d. in Ro’i 
66 Ro’i, Yaakov, 5
67 ‘Programma i ustav Islamskoi Partii Vozrozhdeniia’, n.d., Ro’i.
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Islam as well.  All problems were to be resolved via legal recourse, though independent 
commissions of the IRP.  The IRP was never officially registered, though the Soviet 
authorities’ tolerance of its activities is testament to the impact of Gorbachev’s 
perestroika and glasnost on Russia’s Muslim community.68 
The IRP and Gorbachev serve as a backdrop to the treatment of Chechnya during 
the last years of the Soviet Union.  While some Muslim groups and organizations made 
tremendous headway in seeking religious and political autonomy in contrast to previous 
decades, this privilege was not equally extended to Muslim communities residing in the 
Caucasus.  Established in 1965, the Council for Religious Affairs, or CRA (Sovet po 
delam religiiy), the government apparatus responsible for collecting intelligence and 
supervising developments among the Soviet Union’s numerous religious communities, 
had long been reporting on the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.  Their reports focused on how the 
Sufi tariqats, or brotherhoods, of Chechen-Ingush ASSR could undermine the Soviet 
regime.  These Sufi brotherhoods held as their cornerstone the tenets of Sufism,69 which 
were a danger to the authority of Soviet institutions and communist ideology in Chechen-
Ingushetia.  Of these reports, one in particular, the “Analytical report on Muridism and 
68 For a thorough and authentic account of the IRP’s formation and failure to influence 
politics outside of Tajikistan, see IRP founding member Valiakhmet Sadur’s “Islamskii 
faktor: zametki i razmyshleniia russkogo musul’manina,” Dia-Logos, (Moscow) 1997, pp. 
224-36.  For further information on the IRPT post-independence, see Chapter 4 of Islam 
in the CIS: A Threat to Stability? by Yaakov Ro’i.  
69 Particularly, the Sufis’ organizational and ideological seclusion, their subordination to 
Muslim authorities and their peculiar religious ritual, especially the zikr’, the integral part 
of ritual of Sufi and dervish orders. 
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measures for neutralizing its negative influence”70 sent by RSFSR CRA Chairman L.F. 
Kolesnikov in May of 1989, concluded that the North Caucasus, specifically the 
Chechen-Ingush ASSR continued to prove a cause of destabilizing concern.71  The report 
asserted that religious extremists had initiated destabilizing activities that affirmed 
traditional Islamic institutions as mandatory, obligatory norms for Muslim daily life.  
This report led to the adoption of “Muslim fundamentalism” by such religious activists in 
the Caucasus, which essentially prescribed the Islamization of society, sanctioning the 
use of force in this end goal.  As Ro’i puts it, “Misinterpreting the extension of 
democracy and glasnost as permissiveness, they [religious activists] proceeded to 
organize all kinds of unsanctioned activity… The activity of the North Caucasians linked 
up wth that of religious fundamentalists in Central Asia , from whom some of them had 
received instruction.”72  Taking Gorbachev’s glasnost initiative as an opportunity to 
advance their activity, these religious fundamentalists in the Northern Caucasus 
organized illicit public activity, meetings, ultimatums and the like.  Moreover, they began 
to attract new members to their ranks, and forged common relations with other Muslim 
groups in the Fergana Valley and Central Asia broadly.  Under this threat of pan-Islamic 
fundamentalism, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was allowed to organize its own religious 
70 Analytic report on Muridism and measures for neutralizing its negative influence’, sent 
by RSFSR CRA Chairman L.F. Kolesnikov to the Yaroslavl’ Oblispolkom, 5 May 1989 - 
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) — the State Archive of the 
Russian Federation, f.R - 1033, o. 1, d. 101, 11.12-21; document in possession of the 
Kenton Institute, Oxford, from Ro’i.
71 Ro’i, p. 5 
72 Ro’i, p. 7-8 
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center and institutions.  This was deemed by the CRA to be less threatening than handing 
over leadership of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR to the religious leadership of Dagestan, 
where a group of intransigent Wahhabist radicals formed the dominant leadership.  
However, in Dagestan and other parts of the Northern Caucasus, clashing factions 
between Islamists identifying with either Sufism, Wahhabism, or non-radical schools of 
Islam created the perfect conditions for conflict.   
In Dagestan, different schools of thought within the Muslim community led to 
various Islamic factions.  This divisiveness within Islam became a driving force in 
Chechnya in the 1990s.  Under the Soviet Union, Islam had been a unifying and 
consolidating force in Chechen society, rallying Chechen nationalists and separatists 
under a common banner in open antagonism to Moscow.  However, a rift developed in 
the 1990s between Chechnya’s traditional Sufi brotherhoods and the Salafis or Wahhabis, 
prominent in Dagestan, further contributing to political instability in Chechnya.  Already 
subject to antagonism and backlash from Moscow, Chechnya was now being torn apart 
from within by rivaling sects of Islam.  This rift marked the beginning of a conflict that 
continues to rage at the time of writing this report. 
D. General Dudaev and the Islamicization of Chechnya  
By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and General Dzhokhar Dudaev’s rise to 
power in the early 1990s, internal instability in Chechnya was rampant.  Testament to the 
level of instability at the time, Dudaev tried to suppress growing political opposition to 
his administration by simply dissolving parliament in 1993, resulting in the death of some 
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seventeen people, thereby exacerbating existing tensions.73  A condition just short of 
complete anarchy rendered the Chechens incapable of achieving their aims using 
nationalist and separatist rhetoric alone. As Gordon Hahn states, “winning on the 
ideational battlefield is equally important to winning on the military battlefield.  An 
ideology capable of effectively articulating grievances and providing a course of action 
that promises success is oft times decisive in mobilizing a movement.”  Islamism did just 
that.  Moreover, the unexpected success of Muslim radicals in Afghanistan against Soviet 
forces at Khost seemed to validate the cause of Islamism, and demonstrated that through 
Islamism, a victory over monolithic Russia was possible.  Between December 1990 and 
February 1991, the Vainakh74 Democratic Party began espousing Muslim rhetoric and 
highlighted the long-standing oppression of Chechen Muslims by Moscow, organizing a 
series of demonstrations under the slogan of Muslim solidarity.  These events stand as a 
preface to Dudaev’s regime and the Islamization of the Chechen cause. 
Trained as a Soviet air force general, Dzhokhar Dudaev took control of Chechnya 
in late 1991.  The state of the collapsing Soviet Union provided an opportunity for 
Dudaev to exploit the chaos and mobilize separatists under the banner of religion.  
Dudaev’s nationalist program centered on Islam; it called for Muslim solidarity and 
stressing the Islamic nature of all Chechen separatist efforts.  Historically, this falls in 
line with a tradition of Chechnya using Islam as a unifying force.  Religious figures have 
73 Walker, Edward W. “Ethnic War Holy War, War O’ War: Does the Adjective Matter in
Explaining Collective Political Violence?”, pp. 28-35.
74 Vainakh was the common name for the Chechen and the Ingush 
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stood at the forefront of Chechen opposition to Moscow for decades, dating back to 
Tsarist times.  In fact, Chechnya’s campaign for political sovereignty has been 
historically waged under the banner of Islam and the establishment of an independent 
Islamic state.  Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, a scramble for power 
ensued, as many of the former Soviet republics began to assert their independence.  In his 
famous speech, Gorbachev’s successor, Boris Yeltsin, dared the former republics to “take 
as much sovereignty as you can stomach!”75  Though he did not explicitly give any 
specifics to this manifesto, in principle, Yeltsin was speaking to those republics that did 
not directly threaten the hegemony of the newly created Russian Federation, such as 
Ukraine and Belarus.  However, the Chechens, fomenting a separatist agenda for 
centuries, took Yeltsin at his word.  In 1992, Chechnya declared independence from 
Russia and attempted to forge their own state.  It was following General Dudaev’s 
declaration of Chechen independence that Islam entered into the Chechen separatist 
struggle as a device for the unification and mobilization of Chechen fighters.  As the 
Chechen republic drifted into banditry, warlordism, and anarchy, receiving scant help 
from the West, Dudaev was compelled to extend communications to the Islamic world.76  
Concomitantly with the establishment of ties to the global Islamist network, General 
Dudaev began to re-fashion himself as a loyal Muslim and Islamic adherent.  Indicative 
of the foreign nature of Islam to the Chechen struggle, Dudaev himself was a thoroughly 
Sovietized former Soviet air force general who had a Russian wife, drank alcohol, and 
75 IZVESTIYA, Aug. 13, 1990 
76 Sakwa, Richard. Chechnia: From Past to Future, Ch. 1. 
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never claimed to be a believer, let alone an Islamist, until he decided he needed support 
from Muslims abroad.  Nonetheless, Islam7778ism as a political ideology was quick to 
take root in Chechnya, and in the ensuing decades, grew in strength and intensity.  The 
reasons for its rapid growth and tenacity in the region are expounded upon in the 
following two chapters. 
77 Walker, Edward W. “Ethnic War Holy War, War O’ War: Does the Adjective Matter in
Explaining Collective Political Violence?”, pp. 28-35.
78 Gall, Carlotta and Thomas de Waal. Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, p. 34. 
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Chapter 2 A Unidirectional History
We, wolves and dogs, share one mother, 
But we refused to surrender. 
Your lot is bowls with food,  
Ours is hunger on the frozen ground 
Tremble in your cages 
When we are out hunting! 
Because more than any bear, 
We wolves hate 
Dogs.  
          —Excerpt from anonymous Chechen poem widely known and memorized by 
Chechen youth during the Soviet period. 
Islam has always been an essential aspect of Chechen identity.  It has historically been 
used as a mechanism to recruit, mobilize, and operationalize the goals of Chechen 
separatism.  But Islam did not start out as the precipitator of war, nor were jihadist 
tactics, displayed by generations of Islamic radicals, endemic to the Chechen’s natural 
repertoire of fighting.  It was not until a growing foreign and domestic jihadist presence 
became dominant in the early 1990s, when Dzhokar Dudaev entered79 Islamic radicalism 
into the political equation of Chechen separatist leaders, that Islamism began to displace 
secular, Chechen separatist aspirations. 
79 Islam has long been present in Chechnya, as is discussed in the first chapter of this 
report.  The sect of Islam indigenous to Chechnya is Sufism, a mystical form of Islam 
that emphasizes personal union with God and reverence for Sufi scholars and saints.  
However, here I mean to say that it was not until Dudaev and the underpinnings of the 
first Russo-Chechen War that Wahhabists and Salafists became prominent and began 
mixing with Chechen nationalists.   
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A. TRACING THE PATH TO RADICALISM 
Beginning with Dzhokhar Dudaev’s proclamation of the independence of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria in 1991, the subsequent three decades have seen the Chechen radical 
separatist movement evolve into a Salafi-jihadist-influenced struggle to establish and 
Islamic caliphate throughout the predominantly Muslim territories within the Russian 
Federation.  Chechnya’s nationalist struggle has undergone a profound ideological 
transformation.  Islamic radicalism has changed the nature of what began as a separatist 
movement for Chechen independence. 
This transformation reached its apex in 2007 with the creation of the Caucasus 
Emirates, Imirat Kavkaz or Severokavkazskiy Emirat, which proclaimed the 
establishment of an Islamic caliphate that continues to threaten to overrun the Russian 
Federation.  The Caucasus Emirate, declared by its leader Doku Umarov (Abu Usman) in 
October 2007, sought to establish a Taliban-style Sharia-based Islamist state within the 
Russian Federation.80 In waging a jihad against the Russian Federation, “The Caucasus 
Emirate and Al Qaeda cooperate with each other and often support each other with regard 
to personnel, training, financing, and propaganda.”81 The Caucasus Emirate undermines 
the political authority of the Russian Federation, and it’s ties to Al Qaeda and global 
terrorist networks is destabilizing to Chechnya.  How did Islamism, both global and 
80 Rainsford, Sarah. “Islamic State May Threaten Russia’s Caucasus,” 2015.
81 “Islamic State of the Caucasus,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ik.htm 
37 
domestic Salafism,82 come to become the dominant force in Chechnya?  How has a 
radical ideology like Islamic extremism proven capable of underpinning the Chechen 
nationalist movement?  What inspires young Chechen men and women, just coming of 
age, to strap a bomb to their chest and hold a crowded Moscow theatre hostage? Is it to 
act in the name of Allah and become one of his chosen favorites, or awliyas?  Such 
singular religious conviction would hardly seem to be the case; the historical narrative 
and cultural history of Chechnya demonstrates a long-standing conflict with Russia, 
beginning in the eighteenth century and centers foremost on Chechen independence and 
autonomy from central authority.  The core Chechen system of values strongly 
enumerates freedom and equality as primary.83   
Chechnya’s assertion to autonomy is based on a distinct ‘historicist’ reading of its 
relationship with Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the current Russian Federation.”84  
This narrative is read by the Chechens as a black-and-white interpretation of oppression, 
subjugation, and exploitation of the Chechen people, punctuated by stories of heroic 
resistance and defiant leaders.  Such a single narrative, unwavering in its polarization of 
Russia versus Chechnya, creates a belief that history warrants Chechen independence.  
82 Salafism is a radicalized strain of Islam.  Generally speaking, Salafis are 
fundamentalists who believe in a return to the original ways of Islam. The word 'Salafi' 
comes from the Arabic phrase, 'as-salaf as-saliheen', which refers to the first three 
generations of Muslims (starting with the Companions of the Prophet), otherwise known 
as the Pious Predecessors. 
83 Bersanova, Zalpa. “Sistema tsennostei sovremennykh chechentsev (po materialam
oprosov)”, in Dmitrii Furman (ed.), Chechnya i Rossiya: obshchestva i gosudarstva, Vol.
3 of Mir, progress, prava cheloveka, pp. 223-49.  
84 Sakwa, Richard. Chechnya: From Past to Future, Ch. 1. 
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While there is an abundance of evidence to suggest that a teleological (distinctly black 
and white), historical reading of Islam in Chechnya is prevalent85, such a singular 
approach to Islamism’s role in Chechen history is incomplete.  In accordance with a 
multi-variable approach that seeks to understand the Chechen conflicts and the role 
played by Islam through various lenses, a monochronic86 understanding is limited in its 
disregard for the complex and multi-layered factors surrounding the issue. Nonetheless, 
such readings of history contribute to a holistic understanding of Islamic radicalism in 
Chechnya.  Moreover, determinist interpretations of Russo-Chechen history have had a 
strong effect on Chechen sentiment towards Russia, and vice versa.   
For example, Western-educated Chechen Umalat Umalatov’s Chechnya through 
The Eyes of a Chechen,87 a poignant and personal account of the hardships faced by 
Chechen families, discusses at length the egregious human rights violations and moral 
misconduct of the Russians against the Vainakh peoples. Umalov’s work discusses the 
exile of Chechens to Turkey at the end of the Great Caucasian war in the 1860s, along 
with other tribulations faced by Umalov’s family throughout the nineteenth century.  In 
the post-Soviet era, such a reading of Chechen history seemingly necessitates Chechen 
independence by demonstrating a historical continuum of oppression and violence.  Such 
85 For a thorough discussion of historical monochronism with regard to Chechnya, see 
Richard Sakwa, “Introduction: Why Chechnya?” in Chechnya: From Past to Future.  In 
addition to Sakwa, the following book is useful in understanding a black-and-white 
reading of Russo-Chechen history: A Blinskii (ed.), Rossiya i Chechnya: 200-letnaya 
voina (St. Petersburg, Satis, 2000).  See also Ben Fowkes (ed.), Russia and Chechnia: 
The Permanent Crisis (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998).  
86 Monochronic is taken to mean determinist, in a historiographical sense 
87 Umalat, Umalov, Chechnya glazami chechentsa, 2001.   
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a teleological approach to the historical process not only elucidates meaning and gives 
purpose to the interpretation of history, but also offers a clear and ineluctable plan of 
action; all means thus become legitimate in the pursuit of this goal, ordained by such a 
determinist reading of history.88 
The issue of Chechen independence presents a curious case in terms of political 
science. In one of the most comprehensive and intensive analyses of secessionism in the 
Soviet Union, scholars Emizet and Hesli (1995) trace the path to secession by various 
ethnic republics and regions in the USSR after its collapse.  Their hypothesis predicts that 
the earlier a region declared sovereignty, the stronger the sense of separatism.  Their 
hypothesis does not hold, however, in the case of Chechnya.  Chechnya declared 
sovereignty and secession concomitantly, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991 and Dudaev’s supplanting Doku Zavgaev by means of an armed coup.89  Indeed, in 
Chechnya, the explanation for separatism is historical in origin.  Rather than there being a 
correlation between sovereignty and secession in Chechnya, “historical symbolical 
resources” provide the answer to the question of why Chechnya declared itself sovereign 
and pursued a separatist movement, to the point of radicalism.90  Chechnya’s separatist 
rhetoric centered largely on a collective narrative of armed resistance, oppression, and 
deportation.  This rhetoric was supplemented by what Ralph Premdas in his study of 
88 Fowkes, p. 5 
89 Emizet, Kisangi N. and Vicki L. Hesli, “The Disposition to Secede: An Analysis of the
Soviet Case,” pp. 492-536.
90 Sakwa, p. 4 
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Asian secessionism calls “primordial factors,” that is, heroic narratives of resistance.91  
Chief among such legends of heroicism is none other than that of Imam Shamil.  
Shamil’s unprecedented success in uniting the Chechen people in resistance against the 
Russian forces has earned him a place in many textbooks, even Soviet ones, as a hero and 
legendary personage.  As stated by Bülent Gökay, “The Shamil legend was actively 
promoted through popular biographies and children’s books, as well as more scholarly 
works.  According to a textbook published in 1937 he was ‘a talented and energetic 
leader… of the mountain people who fought against the tsarist colonialists.’  Shamil was 
presented in Soviet history textbooks as a brave and capable military leader, and an 
opponent of local feudalism.  The religious element of his struggle was ignored or 
rationalized.”92 Such figures and collective memories worked in tandem with a shared 
history of repression to inspire in Chechnya an inexplicable sense of warranted 
independence. 
Historical precipitators are not all-determining, but they provide a necessary 
context to understanding how Islamism, first Sufism and later Wahhabism, came to 
dominate the political climate of Chechnya.   By the time of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when viewed through a lens of Russian repression and Chechen subjugation, a 
clear and inexplicable trajectory had developed for Chechnya: Chechen secession and the 
formal recognition of an independent Chechen state.  Those who opposed this discourse 
91 Premdas, Ralph. “Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective,” pp. 12-31.
92 Gökay, Bülent, “The Russian Debate over Shamil,” in Ben Fowkes (ed.) Russia and 
Chechnia: The Permanent Crisis, pp. 34-35.
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were seen as traitors to the demands of history by those who bought into a teleological 
reading of Chechen history.  In fulfilling this obligatory aim, Islam was treated as a 
means to an end; religion used as a political device for unifying and mobilizing a 
population.  The Chechen populace saw their Muslim identity as inseparable from their 
Chechen identity.  To the extent that they were devout, practicing Muslims is arguable; 
however, Islam was seen as an inexplicable element of Chechen identity.  For example, 
Moshe Gammer argues that Islam has historically comprised an integral part of Chechen 
identity.93  As a result, in the eyes of Chechens, centuries-long repression at the hands of 
the Russians, and the subsequent wars, which were fought along not just political but 
religious lines, helped cement the notion that Chechen oppression was tied to Muslim 
oppression, and vice versa. 
While there is sufficient evidence to further the polemic that the history of Russo-
Chechen relations is a singular story of ruthless repression, this position would ignore the 
full and complex context necessary to understand the situation.  The Russian empire was 
a multifaceted kingdom that made use of a variety of strategies in governing its 
constituency.94  Although Chechnya’s experience under Soviet control was one of 
subjugation, the apogee of which was the deportation of its entire population in February 
1944.  However, the period between 1957 -- the date of Chechnya’s reconstitution as a 
93 Gammer, M. “Nationalism and History: Rewriting the Chechen National Past," In:
Coppieters, B. and Huysseune, M. (2002) Secession, history and the social sciences. 
1st ed. Brussels, Belgium: VUB Brussels University Press. Ch. 4. 
94 For more information on the governance of the Russian Empire, see Geoffrey 
Hosking, Russia: People and Empire 1552 - 1917, London, Harper Collins, 1997 
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republic together with Ingushetia -- and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 is widely 
considered to be a period of relative peace and stability.95 During this time Chechnya 
developed considerably culturally, though it remained economically underdeveloped in 
comparison to other Soviet regions, a point I elaborate below in the section on Chechen 
structural problems.  Indeed, Chechnya’s troubled history is punctuated by periods of 
relative calm.  For example, following the end of Imam Shamil’s struggle in the 1860s, 
Chechnya entered into a time of prosperity and development.96  Nevertheless, even during 
this span of “stability,” Chechens were regarded with apprehension by the Russian 
authorities and were not allowed to govern themselves.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a unidirectional reading of history 
was appropriated by insurgent groups as a means for seizing and maintaining power.97  
When read in an international context, the Chechen argument raises a host of questions, 
chief among them: “When does a state have the right to secede?”  Chechen nationalism 
indubitably carries with it vast global implications and should not be treated as if in a 
vacuum.  Still, Chechen leadership remained steadfast in their teleological reading of its 
own history. Moshe Gammer states that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Chechen independence efforts were still conducted largely in the context of the Soviet 
Union: “Thus, while striving to de-Sovietize, the new Chechen historical narrative is still 
95 Sakwa, Richard. Introduction: Why Chechnia? p. 6 
96 Sakwa, pp. 6-7 
97 ibid.   
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strongly linked to Soviet narratives, ways of arguing and moulds of thinking.”98  Such a 
parochial interpretation of history consequently led to a determinist understanding of 
Chechnya’s future trajectory by Chechen elites.  To be sure, voices of dissent arose in the 
early stages of Chechnya’s independence movement, but they were quickly 
marginalized.99  This situation resulted in Chechen leadership becoming unable to view 
their own case outside of such limited circumstances.  A determinist reading of a nation’s 
history may be counted as pre-political, that is to say, it is independent of political 
processes.  There is no discourse to the contrary of Chechen independence, and 
consequently autonomy is non-negotiable; political methods of understanding it are not 
applicable.  As stated by Richard Sakwa, “Perhaps the most important political 
consequence is the displacement of sovereignty from the actual, existing people living in 
the present to a mythical historicized people represented by the political struggle, whose 
views become ascriptive and authoritative rather than representative and contentious.”100   
As is the case with many regions spawning separatist movements, this singular 
recollection of history and the subsequent discourse towards Chechen autonomy formed 
the background to Chechnya’s political culture. 
Moreover, Chechnya’s ideological politics is corroborated by specific social 
conditions, concretely, a system of values that prioritizes independence.  The repression 
98 Gammer, Moshe.”Nationalism and History: Rewriting the Chechen National Past,” in
Bruno Coppieters and Michel Huysseune (eds), Secession, History and the Social 
Sciences (Brussels, VUB University Press, 2002), pp. 117-40.  
99 Sakwa, p. 7. 
100 Ibid. 
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of the Chechen nation under Stalin, culminating in the deportation of the entire populace 
in 1944, not only fomented a grudge against the Russian state, it also destroyed many 
“modernized” Chechen groups, such as the intelligentsia and Party bureaucracy.  
Consequently, the Soviet Union paradoxically accentuated the traditional social order and 
values.101  Though many Chechens willing participated in the Second World War, the 
decision to deport the Chechens and Ingush was made immediately after the Caucasus 
region had been rid of German troops.102  During this time, correspondence between 
Stalin and Beria makes for a grim, though thorough, understanding of the reasons for the 
deportation en masse.  Enumerated among them were the Chechens “low level of labour 
discipline,” the “prevalence of banditry and terrorism, “ “failure of the Chechens to join 
the Communist Party,” and the purported “confession of a German agent that he found a 
lot of support among local Ingush.”103  Beria’s instructions were to deport the entirety of 
the Chechen-Ingush republic; Stalin’s order gave a targeted number of 459,486.  Beria 
was more than successful in this aim; the total deported amounted to 387,229 Chechens 
and 91,250 Ingush for a total of 478,479.104  The deportation of the Chechen and Ingush 
population was a remarkable demographic blow to these populations, but there were 
severe social and psychological repercussions, as well.  The deportations paradoxically 
101 Ibid. 
102 Fowkes, Ben, p. 10. 
103 Bugai, N.F., L. Beriia - I. Stalinu: ‘Soglasno Vashemu Ukazaniiu’ (Moscow: AIRO-XX,
1995). pp 90-1 
104 Beria’s telegram of 22 February 1944 to Stalin, quoted in M.A. Vyltsan, ‘Deportatsiia
Narodov v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny’, Etnograficheskoe Obizrenie (1995), no.
3, pp. 36-8.  
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strengthened the tenacity of the Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Qadiriya tariqa.105  The 
Qadiriya are members of the Qadiri Sufi order, or tariqa, which preaches adherence to 
the fundamentals of Islam.106  Even after the Chechen-Ingush republic was reconstituted 
in 1957, the construction of mosques was forbidden.  As a result, no loyal Islamic 
hierarchy arose to undermine the independent Sufi brotherhoods.107  According to Soviet 
sources, there were some 62,000 mürids, or disciple of Sufism, among the Chechens and 
Ingush in 1974.108  This number comprised over half the total number of practicing 
Muslims in the republic.  Additionally, it helped to strengthen the teip clan system in 
place.  The Chechen clan system was closely linked to the religious practices of the 
Chechens, as the clan court, the kkhel, presided over by clan elders, made its rulings in 
accordance with the sharia, or Islamic law.109  Psychologically and socially, the Chechen 
experience with deportation led to the complete rejection of the Soviet system, and the 
reinforcement of traditional values intimately tied to Islam.110  Naturally, this rejection 
cultured problems for the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation, for decades to 
come. 
The social structures contributing to a unidirectional history of Chechnya were 
preponderant at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing Chechen 
putsch, or coup d’etat.  The Chechen revolution of 1991 resulted in the replacement of a 
105 Fowkes, p. 11. 
106 “The Qadiriya Sufi Way,” http://sunnirazvi.net/qadiri/main.htm
107 Sakwa, p. 7 
108 Beningsen, op. cit.,in Fowkes, p. 74. 
109 Fowkes, p. 11.  
110 Fowkes, p. 11.   
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Sovietized elite with insurgents external to the Soviet system, as well as the usurping of 
Sovietized “lowlander” Chechens by more traditional “highlanders.”  This revolution was 
strengthened by actions of the Russian leadership during the months following the failed 
August coup attempt.  For instance, at the time, Russian leadership included ethnic 
Chechen Ruslan Khasbulatov at the head of the Russian parliament, the Congress of 
People’s Deputies, and its smaller operative, the Supreme Soviet.  There was little 
cooperation between Khasbulatov and the Chechen insurgents, and ultimately, these 
interactions did not help lead to a peaceful outcome.111  It should be noted that while 
social basis for liberalism among Chechens was weak, it was not non-existent.  There was 
a handful of voices for a more nuanced approach to Chechen independence.  Scholars 
such as Dzhabrail Gakaev have written much on such alternative approaches.112  General 
Dudaev’s approach for example, was not wholly radical.  Officially, Dudaev called for 
Chechnya to become a full republic outside of Russia but within the Soviet Union.  
Indeed, up to his death in April 1996, he can be considered a loyalist to the Soviet 
system, even though the USSR proper had long since collapsed.113  Even the 
contemporary interpretations of the greatest of Chechnya’s heroes in the struggle against 
the Russian monolith, Imam Shamil, was subjective.  As Umar Avturkhanov, the leader 
of one of the groups opposed to Dudaev’s “crazed tyranny” in 1994, phrased it to 
Chechenist, Anatol’ Lieven: 
111 Sakwa, p. 7. 
112 See Dzhabrail Gakaev, “Put’ k chechenskoi revolyutsii,” in Furman (ed.), Chechnya i 
Rossiya, pp. 150-76 
113 Lieven, Anatol’. Chechnya, p 58.
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They talk about the tradition of Shamil, but what did Shamil do for Chechnya in 
fact?  He brought us only decades of unnecessary war, the ruin of the country and 
the death of half its people.  And he wasn’t even a Chechen. He came here from 
Daghestan, preaching his crazy religious fanaticism, hatred of the Russians and 
holy war, and we Chechens behaved like fools as usual, and followed him, to our 
destruction.114    
Chechnya’s historical understanding, therefore, was not without nuances, and even today, 
despite a ruthless history of oppression, there are those in Chechnya who still support the 
notion of accommodation and cooperation with Russia.115  Scholar Igor Rotar notes that 
even battle-hardened Chechen insurgents regretted the break up of the Soviet Union and 
looked upon the former Soviet Union fondly and with nostalgia, remarking that they were 
the “best days of my life.”116  However, most Chechens have a predominantly 
mythopoeic view of history, moderated by the presence of variable historical 
interpretations, as well as several ahistorical factors.  A unidirectional history does well 
to explain a great deal of the Checheno-centric motives behind Chechen independence.  
The Chechen historical framework serves to clarify the use of Islam as a political device 
for mobilizing a populace who see their struggle as distinct and historically validated.  
The following sections explain the political factors in this struggle.  
114 Lieven, Chechnya, p. 304 
115 Rotar, Igor. Pod zelënym znamenem islama: islamskie radikaly v Rossii i SNG
(Moscow, AIRO-XX, 2001), p. 21 
116 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3 Towards a Complex Understanding
When will blood cease to flow in the mountains? 
When sugar-canes grow in the snows  
—A Caucasian Proverb 
A systems theory, or multi-causal, approach to the study of any political 
phenomenon pursues equally all levels of analysis, and aims to prioritize independent, or 
causal, variables in accordance with their causal necessity and sufficiency.  Gordon 
Hahn, scholar on Chechnya, states: 
To understand why alienated, anti-social, sociopathic or other personalities 
succumb to political extremisms, in this instance revolutionary jihadism, 
one needs to examine the entire complex of potential contributing factors.  
These include structural independent variables (social, historical, cultural, 
and religious factors, including state and regime weakness or breakdown), 
and intervening or operationalizing independent variables such as 
ideology, agency (authority, leadership, organization and individual 
psychologies), and politics (the structure of political action between 
contending actors).117   
Thus any complete discussion of the rise of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya needs to 
supplement an analysis of the various structural conditions118 with operational variables.  
117 Hahn, Gordon M. The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's 
North Caucasus and Beyond, Kindle Location 192. 
118 By structural, I mean those explanatory variables that are not politically contingent, 
and are often endemic to Chechnya or carry a historical legacy, such as culture, religion, 
our social conditions.  This is in contrast to politically contingent, or operational variables, 
which are those that are subject to a condition of being in flux.  These operational 
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Such an approach gives not only a backdrop for understanding the Chechen quagmire, 
but also helps explain how pivotal factors intersect to produce the current status of 
Chechnya as a hub of the global jihad movement.  This is not to avoid the common 
comparative political “problem of parsimony,” but rather to provide a necessary multi-
causal explanation.  The variables involved in the Chechen question are many.  This 
report chooses to focus on problems with state formation, cultural, and religious factors, 
problems with ideology, and political maneuvers, in particular the power plays of current 
Russian President Vladimir Putin.   
A. Structural Explanations 
PROBLEMS WITH STATE BUILDING 
In addition to a history of resistance, Chechnya suffered from an inability to create a 
cogent state.  The local communist leadership of Chechnya only became Chechenized119 
in the last days of the Soviet Union.  By this time, the ethnic Chechen elite120 were vexed 
by the problem of whom to trust: Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, the hardliners121 
variables include ideology, agency, organization, or political maneuvers, often intervene 
at critical junctures.  They can be seen as pivotal in turning the Chechen situation from a 
nationalist struggle to a ghazavat.  
119 In this context, “Chechenization” refers to the development of a substantial ethnic
Chechen communist elite in the Chechen republic. 
120 By elite here, I mean local communist leadership in Chechnya in the last years of the 
Soviet Union 
121 Here, I mean those members of the Soviet leadership who sought to preserve the 
Soviet Union at all costs, specifically, the “Gang of 8.”  Most famous of the Soviet 
hardliners, this group called themselves the “State Committe for State Emergencies.”
These were the eight Soviet leaders who attempted a coup against Gorbachev in 1991, 
Oleg Baklanov, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Valentin Pavlov, Boris Pugo, Vasily Stardubtsev, 
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who sought to preserve the Soviet empire at all costs, or Gorbachev’s successor, Boris 
Yeltsin.  Doku Zavgaev, senior Soviet Communist Party official and former First 
Secretary to Chechnya, sought to circumvent this problem by placing himself at the head 
of a national movement aligned with Yeltsin, designed to put pressure on Gorbachev and 
Soviet leadership.  However, Major-General Dzhokhar Dudavev, elected leader of the 
Chechen National Congress in March 1991, moved in opposition to Zavgaev.  The 
charismatic Dudaev, a Chechen born in deportation, is attributed a great success in 
uniting the nation due to the fact that he was not attached to any of the major Chechen 
clans.122  In this sense, he is reminiscent of religious leaders of earlier centuries, who were 
also able to play a mediating role within the factitious Chechen teip system because of 
their religious supra-clan authority.  Dudaev’s Pan-National Congress began immediately 
advocating for a democratic and nationalist program.  Their efforts became increasingly 
radical as the collapse of the USSR proceeded, and by June of 1991, they demanded a 
treaty with the nascent Russian Federation, pressing for the “unconditional recognition of 
the right of the Chechen nation to independence.”123  The Chechen separatist leadership 
Aleksandr Tiziakov, Dmitri Yazov, and Gennady Yanaev.  See Rodney P. Carlisle, and 
J. Geoffrey Golson, The Reagan Era from the Iran Crisis to Kosovo, pp. 108-109   
122 The substantiation of this claim is subject, but it is a fact widely stressed in the 
writings of Russian journalists.  For an interpretation of Chechen politics in terms of clan 
membership, see D. Makarov and V. Batuyev, ‘Chechentsy i Teipy’, argument i Fakty,
no. 3 (796) (January 1996) p.2. However, in the absence of any serious anthropological 
studies, the question of Dudaev’s lineage must be left open.
123 Broxup, M. B. “After the Putsch, 1991”, in M.B. Broxup, The North Caucasus Barrier,
p. 233
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sought to exploit a revolutionary situation124 in 1991. From the outset, Dudaev’s aim was 
Chechen independence.  Dudaev’s program, however, was built upon a platform that was 
more than nationalist in its approach.  When Dudaev declared Chechen independence in 
response to Yeltsin’s proclamation that former Soviet states should feel at liberty to claim 
their newfound freedom, he did not hesitate to capitalize upon the mobilizing power of 
Islam in order to achieve Chechen independence.  Indeed, religious figures had been the 
vanguard of Chechen independence movements for centuries.  Consequently came as no 
surprise that the Chechen separatist opposition evoked battle using Islamic slogans, often 
worn on headbands or tied to guns,125 and Allah-u-Akhbar!” became a frequent battle 
cry.126    
The relative role of nationalism versus that of Islam in Chechnya’s independence 
movement and ensuing wars is subject to debate.  But it may be generally stated that the 
early Chechen independence movement was largely religious in origin, predicated upon 
Russian oppression of the mountain-dwelling Chechens, whose claim to Muslim identity 
threatened the Eastern Orthodox empire of the tsar.  This resistance, spanning the late 
eighteenth century to the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, made 
use of Chechnya’s complicated, albeit irrefutable, relationship to Islam.  From 1921 
124 Defined here as a credible, competing alternative authority to the current regime’s
ruling group or group’s, arising out of the need to seize and consolidate power, thereby
constituting a sociopolitical revolution.   
125 Seely, Robert, The Russian-Chechen Conflict 1800-2000: A Deadly Embrace, p. 306. 
See also, M.S. Ashimbaev and A. Zh. Shomanov, “Politizatsiia islama na postsovetskom
prostranstve: uroki i vyzovy dila Kazakhstana,” Analytic - Analiticheskoe obozrenie, 1
October 2000, p. 11.  
126 Walker, p.30. 
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forward, the Chechen struggle became more secular in nature, advancing a strong agenda 
of nationalism and the right to self-determination, a concept in sharp contrast to Russia’s 
imperialist legacy.127  This initial transformation from a religious, Islam-based rhetoric to 
a nationalist platform became religious again following Chechnya’s brief rendezvous 
with freedom following the conclusion of the first Chechen War in 1996.  Dudaev 
introduced universalistic models, not of nationalism, but, in particular, of Islam and 
regionalism among the Caucasian peoples.128  This inconsistency in part contributed to 
the inability of Chechnya to develop an independent state.  Moreover, Dudaev was 
unable to draft a clear trajectory for Chechnya.  Dudaev wrestled with the choice of 
leading Chechnya down the path toward becoming a democratic, market-oriented 
country, or toward an Asiatic-statist (bureaucratic) state.  His rhetoric and initial 
maneuvers indicated that he leaned towards democracy, but his Sovietist proclivities 
eventually drove him towards a more bureaucratic form of governance.129  Dudaev, 
however, cannot fully be blamed for Chechnya’s inability to form a coherent regime.  
Dudaev exacerbated long-existing tensions due to the existing social and cultural 
contracts in Vainakh society.  
The underdevelopment of the Chechen state raises a host of questions about the 
relationship between state and society, and the development of a sound political culture.  
Chechen society, admittedly, does not lend itself to the construction of a cogent state.  
127 Sakwa, Richard. Chechnya: From Past to Future. p 8 
128 Ibid. 
129 Sakwa, p 9 
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Chechen society is differentiated into a clan system, composed of various teips.  And 
while in some respects Chechnya has undergone some level of modernization, it remains 
largely traditional.  A teip, or clan, is an extended community system.  Each teip, about 
130 in total, consists of groups of families who trace their lineage to a single shared 
ancestor.  The average Chechen is said to know the constituency of his own teip well, up 
to seven generations back.130  Each clan is presided over by a teip elder.  While the role of 
the clan elder has diminished in recent years, they still retain a vital role.  As Lieven 
outlines, “…the teip has a varying significance for Chechens, depending on the degree of 
their ‘modernisation,’ their urbanisation, their education, their place of habitation, and 
indeed, their degree of ideological nationalism or religious commitment — I have heard a 
few Chechen nationalists, especially ones of a religious cast, declare that the teip tradition 
should really be done away with, because all that matters is the nation and God.  
However, as with so many such traditions in the period of their ong decomposition, the 
teip continues to play a role in ‘rites of passage,’ and most especially in burials.”131  
Decades of conflict and war have divided power between the traditional social system of 
teips in Chechnya and military commanders and militant hierarchy.  At their core, 
however, Chechens retain high regard for their teip elders and still identify strongly with 
their clans.132   
130 Sakwa, p.9 
131 Lieven, p. 342, see also Richard Sakwa, “Introduction: Why Chechnya?” in 
Chechnya: From Past to Future, pp. 9-11. 
132 Lieven, Tombstone of Russian Power, p. 342. 
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This situation has created a political culture founded on highly egalitarian, 
anarchic principles.  Robert Jackson examines what he calls “quasi-states,” ex-colonial 
states that have straddle the line between established statehood and possessing juridical 
capacities.  For these post-colonial entities, the process of state building is far from 
complete.  Chechnya, for the purpose of this report, is a such a quasi-state; it has 
achieved a degree of autonomy from Russia, and is capable of self-governance, though it 
suffers from an inability to realize fully those international standards by which we 
determine a state.  Chechnya has succeeded in establishing what Anatol Lieven refers to 
as133 “ordered anarchy.”134  But Chechnya is also an ethnic nation.  Chechens’ 
conception of nationalism is not the product of years of state-building, socio-economic 
development or higher education (perhaps it is – under Soviets); rather, their espousal of 
nationalist rhetoric is predicated on a factional traditional social order, with a respective 
system of law: the adat; unity predicated on disunity in essence.  As discussed in the 
previous section, Chechen identity is, in large part, derived from a centuries-old historical 
legacy.  Thus, in many ways, Chechen society faces an uphill battle in forming a modern 
state.  The egalitarian spirit of the Vainakh peoples does not coalesce with international 
state enfranchisement, which requires a system of governance capable of subordinating 
an inherent Chechen tendency towards anarchism.  Only in times of war and conflict 
have the Chechens been able to exchange their traditional social structure in favor of 
133 Jackson, Robert. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third 
World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 21-22. 
134 Lieven, Chechnya, p. ix
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unification.135 For instance, during the reign of Nicholas I, following a series of harsh tax 
increases against the Chechens in the 1820s, the Chechens began rallying around 
Naqshbandi preachers who progressed from urging religious piety to promoting liberation 
from the Russian yoke.136 
This trade-off is key to understanding the role of Islam in Chechnya: Islam was 
key to Chechen, and pan-Caucasian for that matter, unification during such times.  As 
Anatol Lieven states: 
[Chechen] victory was part of an intermittent historical pattern whereby 
apparently ‘primitive’ forces, through superior morale, tactical skill and 
the right circumstances, have defeated modern imperial armies in the 
course of this century, and as such it is a warning against not just Russian 
racism but Western technological arrogance too.  However, while 
Chechen society has previously been able to generate a rather effective 
form of ‘ordered anarchy,’ it seems unable to bear the weight of any 
modern state - even a Chechen one.137   
The Chechen quasi-state, capable of victory over the Russian bear, was incapable of 
consolidating Chechen proclamations of independence into an effective state.  What 
ensued was not a modern law-governed political order, but a highly criminalized clan-
type social order.138  The tradition-based egalitarianism inherent in Chechen social order 
135 Wood, Tony. Chechnya: The case for independence. Verso: 2007, pp. 18-23. 
136 Wood, Tony. Chechnya: The case for independence. Verso: 2007, pp. 22-23. 
137 Lieven, Chechnya, p ix.  
138 Sakwa, Richard. pp. 10-11. 
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was simply not conducive to the establishment and consolidation of an inclusive 
democratic state.  Chechen instability manifested in full-effect following Dudaev.  No 
effective postwar state-building and reconstruction emerged in Chechnya due to lack of 
funds and weak governmental capacity in a highly militarized, impoverished, and 
traumatized society following the events of 1999.139 
The power vacuum in Chechen leadership following their initial victory in the 
first Chechen War was quickly filled by Aslan Maskhadov, one of Dudaev’s most 
distinguished generals.  After the Khasavyurt agreement, Maskhadov sought to advance 
himself from able insurgent to successful statesman.  In what is widely considered to be a 
relatively free and fair election,140 Maskhadov won the Chechen presidency in January 
1997.  About half a million people voted after a highly public campaign.  These were the 
first and last elections that approximated to OSCE norms of democratic criteria held in 
Chechnya. Tim Guldimann, coordinator of the OSCE mission in Chechnya, said that the 
vote “reflected the freely expressed will of the voters” and “established a legitimate 
foundation for the new system of authority.”141  Russia acknowledged Maskhadov’s 
victory formally, and Chechnya it seemed, was on the path towards legitimate 
independence.  Officially the Khasavyurt Accord postponed final decision of Chechnya’s 
formal status for five years, but de facto Chechnya was already regarded as a newly 
independent state.  Enter into the equation the previously discussed problem of historical 
139 Hughes, James, Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad, Ch 4, p. 94. 
140 Lieven, Anatol, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, p. 145. 
141 Moscow News, 30 January 1997. Run-off elections for the parliament were held until 
March 1997, in James Hughes, From Nationalism to Jihad, p. 228.  
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monochronocism142 and the perpetual victimization of Chechnya, and the new republic 
quickly ran into problems with state-formation.  Following the second failed Russo-
Chechen war, a Russian blockade and international isolation left Maskhadov with an 
impossible task.143  State building required a political process that was civically inclusive 
and demanded compromise.  Chechnya proved unable to construct effectively a state 
proper, and declined into lawlessness and crime, which threatened conflict both locally 
and regionally and, eventually, again provoked Russia.144  During this period of 
ineffective governance, radical forms of Islam began to flourish in the Chechen Republic.  
In this climate of crime and corruption, banner-carriers for radical Islam, such as 
fighters and warlords steeled by the experience of the first war -- most notably Shamil 
Basaev, began espousing increasingly extremist Islam and jihadist rhetoric.145  
Maskhadov was unable, and ultimately unwilling, to counter such rhetoric.  He failed to 
produce what Weber calls a “legitimate statehood.”146  Maskhadov was unable to 
establish the principle Weberian requirement of state building - monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force.  Chechen insurgents, and Islamist fighters, with Basaev as their 
vanguard, continued to wreak havoc and engage in activities such as hostage-taking.  The 
restlessness of the Chechen people, aspiring to independence, but finding no solace in 
142 While problems associated with monochronicism and determinist historical narratives 
are not unique to Chechnya, they are nonetheless pertinent to a complex understanding 
of Islamism in Chechnya.  
143 Hughes, James, Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad, Ch 4, p. 94. 
144 Sakwa, Richard. Chechnya: From Past to Future, pp.10-11 
145 Ibid. 
146 Hughes, James. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict 
in the 21st Century), p. 96.  
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years of ineffective state-building and bitter war with Russia, saw in jihadist ideology a 
structured, integrative political discourse.  This discourse offered the possibility of relief 
from the weight of the Russian Federation and came with the positive externality of 
religious salvation an enduring freedom.  In the maelstrom of the late 1990s, where 
kidnapping, banditry, slavery, ransoming, and general aggression, not just confined to 
Chechnya147, relief from this volatility was highly appealing. Islamic radicalism and 
jihadism provided to be not just an ideology around which to rally, but a highly organized 
and proven-effective methodology.  It was, as Anna Matveeva states, “a struggle for 
political order, where historical and demographic factors are pertinent, but, not 
withstanding, the problems facing the region are basically modern, i.e., building a cogent 
state.”148  Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up a power vacuum throughout 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, while Russia struggled to find an effective way of 
asserting its interests.  The militant warlords, such as Basaev, sought to exploit the 
situation in order to take more territory from Russia and to create “an Islamic republic 
from the Black to the Caspian Sea.”149  In response, Russia argued that it was obliged to 
act within the terms of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security that 
was signed at the OSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994.  Thus, the events 
147 I refer here to the two notorious Chechen invasions of neighboring Dagestan in 
August and September 1999 
148 From Matveeva, Anna, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Fragile Borderland, (London, 
Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1999). Summary, quoted in Richard Sakwa, 
Chechnya: From Past to Future, p. 11 
149 S Shermatova, “Tak nazyvaemye vakhkhabity”, in Chechnya i Rossiya: obshchestva i 
gosudarstva (Moscow, 1999), p. 419, quoted in Richard Sakwa, Chechnya: From Past to 
Future, p. 16  
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leading up the Russian invasion of Chechnya in 1996, violating the Khasavyurt 
Agreement, were not of Chechen separatist origin, but rather that of political radicals who 
sought to capitalize upon Chechen instability and Russian weakness, rallying under the 
banner of Islam in order to achieve this goal.  The chaos resulting from Chechnya150’s 
brief stint with de facto independence provided Basaev and other such espousers of jihad 
with the window of opportunity needed to consolidate Islamic radicalism and sow the 
seeds for its propagation. 
A. CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
“The situation in the North Caucasus remains strained. Extremists are stepping up their 
subversive terrorist activities and at the same time are trying to conduct a campaign to 
discredit the government bodies of the North Caucasus republics.”151 — President 
Medvedev, February 2009   
THE RESONANCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM 
Islamism152 as a unified ideology proffers one of the most potent ideologies in the world 
in terms of mobilizing and operationalizing a community towards radicalism and 
extremist action.  Where nationalism, socialism, and other ideologies have failed to 
mobilize a populace towards action, Islamism has succeeded in providing a resonant 
150 Paragraph 6 states that ‘participating states will take appropriate measures to prevent
and combat terrorism in all its forms,’….
151 Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), February 6, 
2009, Doc. No. CEP-950260.  
152 Islamism is here defined as a normative political ideology that holds at its core the 
establishment of an alternative form of government, namely, the establishment of an 
Islamic Caliphate.  
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ideological foundation, suffice to precipitate a complete sociopolitical revolution.153  
Islamism offers a complete program for social and political transformation, against both 
Western cultural penetration and oppressive governments like that of the Soviet 
Union/Russian Federation.  Moreover, it offers a guarantee of millenarian salvation and 
security in the afterlife with Allah.154  Though Islamism did not start out as a primary 
cause of the Russo-Chechen Wars, it has become a significant factor.  The protracted 
fighting and disorder associated with the wars has ensured that Islamism and jihadist 
efforts have not only subsisted through the centuries, but have in fact proliferated.  As 
Märta-Lisa Magnusson states, “The proliferation of radical Islam, [however], is not a 
cause but an effect of the previous and the current wars.”155  For the most part, the wars in 
Chechnya began as a secessionist struggle against the Russian Federation.  The divisive 
line of cleavage pitting the two parties against each other was not religious in origin, but 
rather ethno-cultural.  On one side of the fence were a proud people who identified as 
Chechen, sharing in a common history, language, culture, and legal recourse, i.e., the 
adat;  on the other were the Russians, here loosely defined as those fighting for the 
preservation of Russian territorial integrity, and those who shared a common language, 
Russian.  In truth, many of those classified as “Russian” were Ukrainian, Tatar or 
153 Here I base my definition of revolution on Theda Skocpol’s definition of what 
constitutes a “complete” revolution, i.e, a successful transformation of both the extant
social and political order.  For more information on the criteria for a revolution proper, 
see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 1979. 
154 Walker, pp.30-31 
155 Märta-Lisa Magnusson, “Prospects for Peace in Chechnya.” Searching for Peace in 
Chechnya — Swiss Initiatives and Experiences.
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Bashkir.156  But in principle they identified with Russia as a state and therefore, Russia 
provided them with a source of national identity.  In defining the shared Chechen 
identity, and struggle for Chechen independence, Islam hardly comprised the most 
prominent feature.  As Edward Walker points out, the underpinnings of the Chechen 
Wars were not religious in nature.  The Chechens fought for independence and 
autonomy, motivated by what may be called ethno-nationalism.157 The Russians, 
however, were galvanized by a sense of statism; the need to preserve the territorial 
integrity of mother Russia and defend her from bandits, separatists and terrorists.158  In 
this sense, the wars originated as an ethnic conflict of sorts.  And while it is true that a 
religious line of division separated the Chechen fighters from the Russians, as most 
Russians were eastern Orthodox and most Chechens Sunni or Sufi Muslims, many 
observers and scholars of the first Chechen War conclude that religion had very little, if 
anything, to do with the outset of conflict.159 In fact, despite the long-standing perception 
of Chechnya as one of the most religious of the ethnic republics in the Northern 
Caucasus, it was Chechnya’s neighbor to the east, Dagestan, that was the hub and center 
of Islamic thought and teaching.  Islam factored very little into the original Chechen 
equation, and played a limited role in mobilizing early Chechen separatism.   
However, as Gordon Hahn states, “Winning on the ideational battlefield by 
effectively disseminating and convincingly propagandizing a revolutionary group’s 





ideological orientation is a key element in mobilizing supporters from among the 
aggrieved.”160  An ideology capable of effectively articulating grievances and providing a 
course of action that promises success is oft times decisive in mobilizing a movement.  
Islamism did just that.  Moreover, the unexpected success of Muslim radicals in 
Afghanistan against Soviet forces at Khost seemed to validate the cause of Islamism, and 
demonstrated that through Islamism, a victory over monolithic Russia was possible.  It 
was following General Dudaev’s declaration of Chechen independence following the 
failed August coup and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 that Islam entered 
into the Chechen separatist struggle as a device for the unification and mobilization of 
Chechen fighters. 
Any political ideology, if it is to substantively influence and mobilize a populace, 
must resonate with the movement in question.  That is to say, it must carry some 
relevance to the population; its followers must be able to identify with the ideology and 
see in it the potential for the successful articulation of their grievances into concrete 
action.  During times of socioeconomic deprivation and political instability, an ideology 
that possesses transformative power carries even greater influence.  It is important to 
clarify that an ideology does not need to possess a completely rational, logical 
infrastructure to resonate with a population.  Rather, resonant ideologies offer a sufficient 
explanation for the current sociopolitical situation, and propose a course of action, or 
solution, to achieve a desired outcome.  In this regard, Islamism proffers a highly 
160 Hahn, Gordon M. The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's 
North Caucasus and Beyond, Kindle Locations 216-218.
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effective ideology of resistance.  Much as Marxism offered a solution to problems of 
economic and class disparities, and a lack of social mobility, Islamism offers an 
explanation of the course of Chechen separatism and its failure to achieve success against 
Russian dominance.  Islamism provides an explanatory ideology for what has transpired 
in Chechnya that has led to the failure of a movement with strictly ethno-nationalistic 
origins, namely, the penetration of alien cultural norms, defeat and humiliation at the 
hands of infidels, corruption and immorality, and straying from the true path of Islam.161  
It identifies who and what is to blame, secular governments, corrupt elites, the purveyors 
of Western culture, Jews and Christians, globalization and modernization, and the 
hegemony of kafirs, and then specifies what must be done to set these wrongs right, be 
pious, make contributions to Islamic charities, join an Islamist party, and become an 
activist in this party, mujahid or shahid, the establishment of an Islamic republic, the 
enforcement of sharia law, and a consequent return to the true path of Islam.  Islam 
offered a ready-made solution to previously unsuccessful attempts at Chechen 
independence vis-a-vis ethno-nationalist rhetoric   
 A failed attempt at state building after the first Russo-Chechen War, and a failed 
regime under Maskhadov, created a political vaccuum in Chechnya.  This vaccuum was 
rapidly filled by fundamentalist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, who, not unlike Putin, 
saw extremism as the only effective strategy of pursuit.  Under the banner of Islam and 
with Allah’s blessing, they sought Chechen independence at all costs.  The politicization 
                                                   
161 Walker, pp.30-31. 
64 
of Islam occurred both internally, and as a result of external influences.  This multi-
layered complexity is in fact part of why the ideology proffered by fundamentalist Islam 
was so resonant in Chechnya, and why it remains tenacious to this day. 
The radicalization of Islamic doctrine in Chechnya was, in part, the result of years 
of military conflict.  The militancy that became a constant feature of Chechen life after 
the outbreak of the first Russo-Chechen War in 1994, led to the operationalization of 
Islam as a resource for uniting an endogenously divided people, and as a source of 
identifiable inspiration for Chechen separatist fighters.  Chechen leaders contextualized 
the conflict with Russia by using historical, iconic symbols and allusions to anti-
Imperialist, anti colonial wars of the past.  This connection evoked a historical memory of 
oppression and conflict with Russia, fought along religious lines.  But the politicization 
of Islam in Chechnya was also a consequence of external influence.  It is no coincidence 
that the growing radicalization of Chechnya’s independence movement occurred in 
tandem with the growth and influence of Al-Qaeda, beginning in the early 1990s.  Al-
Qaeda viewed Chechnya as a platform, much like Bosnia, Kashmir and other such 
Islamic nations, from which it could propagate its mission of global jihad against the 
“West.”162  Arab fighters and financial support were sent to Chechnya to support the 
162 The global jihad movement was intent on entering into conflict with the West, but also 
those states that threatened to inhibit the return to fundamentalist Islam in Islamic states.  
In this regard, Russia too became a target of the global jihadist movement, for its 
crackdown on Islamism in the Northern Caucasus, reaching an apex under the first Putin 
administration.  
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Chechen resistance movement from Khost.  Thus both internal and external pressures led 
to the radicalization of Islamic identity in Chechnya. 
The emergence of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya can be viewed as the result of a 
paradox: the Chechen leadership employed Islamic slogans in order to radicalize the 
population and inspire them to military victory against Russia, but this victory then 
empowered the radicals and created a situation in which they attempted to impose a form 
of Islam (Wahhabism) that was alien to the vast majority of the population.  This dual 
reinforcement meant that, while resonant among a majority of Chechens, Islamism as a 
political ideology, beyond the parameters of its utilitarian capacities to mobilize Chechen 
fighters, did not grow organically from within Chechnya.  Rather, it was the imposed 
consequence of Wahhabist leaders, whose rhetoric was validated by military victories 
over monolithic Russia.  Adding to the complexity of the situation, Islamic radicalism 
was appropriated to differing degrees within Chechnya.  For example, Wahhabism took 
hold in the highland region, the base of Shamil Basaev’s forces.163  This is perhaps due to 
the fact that traditional Sufist communities were more embedded in the highland regions, 
and thus their memory of marginalization, disenfranchisement and historical animosity 
with Russia resounded more strongly among them.  It is probable, then, that the traumatic 
experiences of harsh military conflict and increasing religiosity coalesced to produce a 
radicalization of the Chechen Islamic identity in the struggle against Russia.     
163 Hughes, James. “Chechnya: the Causes of a Protracted Post-Soviet Conflict.” Civil 
Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Winter 2001), LSE Research Online, pp. 34-39 
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The radicalization of Islam in Chechnya was a multi-causal phenomenon.  While 
it proved highly effective as a political ideology in uniting and mobilizing Chechen 
fighters, the tenets of fundamentalist, Wahhabist Islam were not endemic to the Chechen 
identity.  However, in the face of a relentless Russian adversary and failed attempts at 
victory through nationalism alone, Islamism offered a solution that was perceived as 
viable.  Whether the core of Islamic fundamentalist ideology truly resonated among 
Chechens is debatable, but political Islam offered a means to an end and capitalized upon 
a centuries-old Chechen religious identity.  The politicization of Islam, beginning in the 
early 1990s, reached an apogee concomitantly with Putin’s rise to power in the late 
1990s.  Consequently, Putin’s actions and policy toward Chechnya are highly pertinent to 
understanding the evolution of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya, and to understanding its 
status today. 
PUTIN’S POWER PLAYS IN THE CAUCASUS 
"What happened was what always happens when a state possessing great military 
strength enters into relations with primitive, small peoples living their own independent 
lives... Either on the pretext of self-defense, even though any attacks are always provoked 
by the offenses of the strong neighbor, or on the pretext of bringing civilization to a wild 
people, even though this wild people lives incomparably better and more peacefully than 
its civilizers, or else on a whole range of other pretexts, the servants of large military 
states commit all sorts of villainy against small nations, insisting that it is impossible to 
deal with them in any other way." [Russian?] 
—Leo Tolstoy, 1902 draft of Hadji Murat 
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September 1, 2004 was the beginning of three-day incident that would 
dramatically alter the course of Russo-Chechen relations.  A group of armed Chechen and 
Ingush Islamic radicals seized School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, North 
Ossetia, an autonomous republic of Russia’s Northern Caucasus adjacent to Chechnya.  
The siege lasted three days, and claimed the lives of 385 people, of them, 186 children.  
During the seizure, over 1,100 individuals were taken as hostages, including 777 
children.  The militants occupying SNO were under the command of Chechen warlord 
and de facto leader of Chechnya’s Wahhabist Muslims, Shamil Basaev.  Basaev 
demanded formal recognition of Chechnya’s independence and the withdrawal of 
Russian forces from Chechnya.  Russia, not conceding, stormed the school on the third 
day of the siege.  In retaliation, hundreds were killed, and many more were wounded, or 
went missing.  The event led to an unprecedented consolidation of power in Kremlin.  As 
stated by Simon Sarazhdyan for The Moscow Times, “Putin used Beslan to toughen laws 
on terrorism and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies. But he did not stop 
there. Putin also used the attack as a pretext for introducing measures that had little to do 
with fighting terrorism and a lot with consolidating power in the Kremlin, such as 
scrapping the election of regional governors.”164  At present, debates still continue 
regarding many details of the seizure, including allegations that journalists were not 
allowed to report freely, allegations regarding the nature of negotiations with the 
164 Sarazhdyan, Simon. “Chechnya Vow Cast a Long Shadow.” The Moscow Times. 
February 2008. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/chechnya-vow-cast-a-long-
shadow/356028.html, accessed August 6 2015 
68 
militants, and questions as to attribution of responsibility.  The Beslan incident involved 
both Chechens and Ingush participants.  SNO was not a random target;  during Soviet 
times, the school was used as a site to gather Ingush during the ethnic cleansing of Ingush 
peoples by the Ossetes.165  Chechnya, too, had a stake in the matter.  Indeed, SNO was the 
site from which several Russian federal attacks against Chechnya were launched.166  For 
the Chechens, the siege was a maneuver in retaliation for the countless deaths and 
widespread destruction of Chechnya during the Chechen wars.  
Initially, responsibility and motivation for the incident was unclear.  After the 
incident, claims began to arise that the attack was influenced by al-Qaeda and the global 
jihad effort.  In the years preceding the incident, Putin showed restraint in attributing 
Russian terrorist attacks to Chechens.  However, in this instance, Putin declared the crisis 
to be a result of the “direct intervention of international terrorism.”167  Putin’s statements 
ignored the nationalist origins of the Chechen demands, instead placing the incident in 
the context of the global jihadism, and pressing for international cooperation against 
Islamic radicalism.  By presenting the Beslan incident, and the ensuing conflict as 
connected to the global narrative of Islamic radicalism, Putin made it possible to take 
unilateral direction in combatting the Chechens. 
165 "Getting Back Home? Towards Sustainable Return of Ingush Forced Migrants and 
Lasting Peace in Prigorodny District of North Ossetia." 
166 Novichkov,N. ”Frontal and Army Aviation in the Chechen Conflict." 
167 “Russia: On Beslan, Putin Looks Beyond Chechnya, Sees International Terror,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 September 2004, 
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Shortly after the attack, Shamil Basaev publicly claimed responsibility for the 
incident.  Basaev enumerated that his Riyadus-Salikhin battalion carried out the SNO 
seizure.  The Beslan incident, quite similar to previous Chechen radicalist attacks, such as 
the taking of the Dubrokva Theatre in 2002 and Chechen raid on Budyonnovsk in 1995, 
was an effort to end Russian oppression of Chechnya and finally to achieve Chechen 
independence.  However, Basaev remarked that he underestimated the cruelty of the 
Russian government in responding to the situation.168  Indeed, reports of Russian use of 
shmel’ vacuum bombs, bombs that draw the oxygen out of a room and use the pressure to 
form an explosion capable of tremendous destruction, led to widespread accusations from 
the international landscape, including the European Union, of rights violations and the 
use of unnecessary force.169  The incident tarnished the political reputation of Chechnya 
as well.  Then President Aslan Maskhadov claimed no responsibility for the incident, 
attributing it to wholly Basaev, who was operating autonomously from the official 
Chechen government at the time.170  Maskhadov spoke out against the claiming of the 
lives of hundreds of children, and issued a statement saying that there was “no 
justification” for the seizing of SNO.171  Nevertheless, the attack became but one step in 
the full demonization of Chechen insurgents, a task carried to completion by Vladimir 
Putin.  
168 Simon Sarazhdyan, “Chechnya Vow Cast a Long Shadow.” The Moscow Times 
169 Smith, David (5 September 2004). "EU doubts shatter unity". The Guardian. 
170 Obituary: Aslan Maskhadov, BBC News, 8 March 2005. 
171 “Maskhadov: Chechnya’s Defiant Ex-Leader.”  
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The Beslan crisis was a loss when evaluated from all sides.  Criticisms abound of 
Putin’s use of the incident to tighten the grip of the Russian government, from groups 
such as the Mothers of Beslan and the Voice of Beslan.172  A series of federal reforms 
following the incident led to decreased democracy in the RF and gave the President 
tremendous unilateral powers.  Putin’s framing of the incident as a terrorist attack directly 
connected to Al-Qaeda, and subsequently, to the U.S. led “war on terrorism,”173 are not 
wholly inaccurate, but they also allotted him a great deal of seemingly justified control.  
This kind of “soft authoritarianism” is a hallmark of the Putin administration’s response 
to Chechen-led terrorism and is essential to understanding of the contemporary state of 
Islamism in Chechnya. 
A CHECHEN BY ANY OTHER NAME 
By the end of the second Chechen War in 2010, Chechnya had long since been labeled a 
rogue state, and the term dead end, in Russian tupik, was widely used by both Chechens 
and Russians.174  Russia was still very much humiliated from its defeat in 1996, and room 
for negotiations with Maskhadov were limited, due to nationalist constraints on both 
sides.  Putin, a hardline “KGBshnik”175 and head of the FSB (Federal Security Service, in 
172 Beslan Mothers Stay In Court All Night, The Moscow Times, 4 May 2007 
See also Smith, David (5 September 2004). "EU doubts shatter unity". The Guardian 
(London).  
173 "The Whole World Is Crying", TIME, 12 September 2004. 
174 Hughes, James. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict 
in the 21st Century), p. 97. 
175 Sometimes used interchangeably with the term “Chekist,” meaning a member of the 
Russian secret police. 
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Russian, Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) 1998-99, adopted a 
policy toward Chechnya typical of leaders of the security establishment, the siloviki, the 
leaders of the security establishment in Russia.  As Hughes phrases it: 
Putin would have been party to the argument of the ‘power ministries,’ 
best exemplified publicly by former minister of defense Kulikov, which 
repeated the mantra-like formula that Chechnya was ungovernable, a 
‘bandit’ and ‘terrorist’ state, increasingly dominated by fanatical 
Wahhabis and intent on wider destabilization in the North Caucasus. The 
only solution was force to reconquer Chechnya by military means and 
‘reimpose order.’ According to this script, Russia’s de facto recognition of 
independence for Chechnya only served to promote further chaos and the 
growth of ‘terrorism.’176   
With Vladimir Putin contextualizing the Beslan incident as a terrorist attack, Russia 
began to embark on a path towards a war on terror, subsequently classifying all 
operations regarding Chechnya as “counterterrorist operations.”177  The military success 
over the Chechens, achieved only through an excessive use of force, was key in Putin’s 
victory in the “khaki” presidential election in March 2000, and later in 2004.178 
It is worth noting the apparent paradox in Putin’s “democratic” rise to power.  
Putin, Yeltsin’s chosen successor, had difficulty in garnering public approval; an August 
176 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 107. 
177 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 110. 
178 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 108. 
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poll prior to the March 2000 elections only showed a 2% approval rating for Putin.179  In 
seeking this approval, Putin and his administration [the siloviki] decided to engage in a 
new war with Chechnya that would later justify the use of highly undemocratic means of 
operation.  As James Hughes states, “The resumption of war with Chechnya was now 
instrumentalized as the means to boost Putin’s popularity in advance of a presidential 
campaign.”180  And while the first war was brought to a conclusion via democratic 
channels, the second was begun in order to win a democratic election.  For better or for 
worse, Putin and his siloviki succeeded in their aims, and Putin won the March 2000 
election.  The backdrop to his presidency was the re-conquest of Chechnya.181  This 
posture would bring validation for the Russian defeat in 1996, and put an end to domestic 
fears of Muslim terrorism.  Putin advanced rhetoric promoting Russian pride, thereby 
equating Russian strength with state strength.  A series of Chechen-attributed organized 
attacks -- bombing apartment buildings in Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Buinaksk in 
September 1999 -- only fueled Putin’s claim to legitimacy.  Furthermore, these attacks 
were instrumental in mobilizing popular opinion and in gaining support from the Duma 
and the cooperation of Russian media.  Putin’s ideological war against Chechnya carried 
him to unprecedented popularity.182    
179 Opinion poll data on Putin’s popularity, August 1999-January 2000. Data accessed 
February 2000 at the Levada Center, http:// www.levada.ru, quoted in Hughes, James 
(2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict in the 
21st Century) (pp. 109-110). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle Edition. 
180 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 110. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Mansur Mirovalev, “Chechnya, Russia, and Twenty Years of Conflict.” Al Jazeera. 
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Thus, a cornerstone of Putin’s policy regarding Chechnya was to frame the issue 
as a question of terrorism, with potential global implications.  Moreover, Putin’s 
justification to such an extreme anti-Chechen war policy was reinforced by the necessity 
of combatting not just domestic terrorism, but the need to keep in check a failed state that 
threatened destabilization of the entire Northern Caucasus region.183  As he explained in 
an interview with Focus magazine in 2001,“it is not an issue of Chechnya’s membership, 
or non-membership, of the Russian Federation.” In Putin’s eyes, Chechnya had become 
“a gangster enclave.”184  Discussion regarding Chechnya’s place within the Russian 
Federation would be to recognize the nationalist underpinnings of the conflict.  Instead, 
Putin spoke about the destabilizing dangers of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya.185  The 
heart of the Chechen issue was superseded by the perception that Chechnya had moved 
beyond the parameters of peaceful negotiations.  Military force became the only viable 
solution. 
Putin’s characteristic approach in dealing with Chechnya was two-fold: first, the 
politicization of the Chechen quagmire and the espousal of rhetoric designed to 
dehumanize the Chechens, regardless of their status as civilian or insurgent;  second, the 
use of counterinsurgency tactics that focused on extreme violence and the coopting of 
Chechen defectors and pro-Moscow elite.  In dehumanizing the Chechen populace, 
183 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 111. 
184 Vladimir Putin interview in Focus (Munich), 24 September 2001. 
185 Hughes, James (2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and 
Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century) (p. 111). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle 
Edition.  
74 
characterizing them as Wahhabists and terrorists, Putin’s use of ruthless military tactics 
became justifiable.  Indeed, the use of such lexicon as “bandit country,” “terrorist state” 
and “gangster enclave” came to be a distinctive feature of Putin’s statements regarding 
Chechnya, often crude and vulgar.  He once remarked on television during a a trip to 
Kazakhstan that he wanted to “waste them [Islamic fundamentalists] in the shithouse.”186  
For example, in November 2002 shortly after the Dubrovka theater attack, when 
questioned at an EU-Russia summit in Brussels by a journalist from Le Monde about 
Russian abuses in Chechnya, Putin angrily retorted: 
“If you want to become a real radical Islamist and are prepared to be 
circumcised, then I invite you to Moscow. We have many religions. We 
have many specialists in this area. I will recommend that they do the 
operation in such a way that you will have nothing left to grow back.”187 
The Kremlin protocol chief termed it an “emotional outburst,” but as one Russian 
journalist put it, the language was more like that used by Putin “in the bania with FSB 
chief Patrushev”188  When speaking more rationally, Putin stressed that Chechnya was 
part of the “global war on terrorism.” He declared that Chechnya was “a platform for the 
expansion of terrorism into Russia,” “hotbeds of terrorism,” “an outpost of international 
186 Putin’s quoted words in Russian were “mochit’ v sortire,” cited in Hughes, James 
(2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict in the 
21st Century) (p. 111). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle Edition. 
187 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 112.  
188 Iuliia Latynina in Novaia gazeta, 15 November 2002; Komsomol’skaia pravda, 13 
November 2002: 3, cited in James Hughes 
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terrorism,” a “bandit enclave” for foreign-funded “Islamic fundamentalists,” a “medieval 
world.”189  This kind of language was a crucial part of his method. 
Putin succeeded in capitalizing upon Chechen radicalism and continues to enjoy 
widespread support for his actions.  Even after the Beslan incident, his approval ratings 
only dipped slightly, and he was able to recover by 2005.190  As James Hughes argues, 
Russian policy in Chechnya has been manipulated to justify authoritarian aspects of 
“Putinization” in Russia, employing what Pavel Baev terms a “counterterrorist 
mobilization”191 to recentralize and consolidate his hold on power in Russia.192  Indeed, 
following his election to Presidency in 2000, Putin institutionalized what he termed a 
“dictatorship of law,” diktaturna zakona.  This policy was intended to correct the 
asymmetric federalism left by Yeltsin.  Putin divided the entirety of the Russian 
Federation into seven federal districts, each presided over by a governor-general, not 
unlike what was used during Imperialist Russia.193  Putin’s federal district plan, intended 
189 See Vladimir Putin, Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 16 May 2003, and 
Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 26 May 2004 
190 Levada Center (formerly VCIOM) surveys, 1999– 2006, cited in Hughes, James 
(2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict in the 
21st Century) (p. 122). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle Edition. 
191 Baev, Pavel. “Instrumentalizing Counter-Terrorism for Regime Consolidation in
Putin’s Russia,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 339– 40.
192 Hughes, James.  Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and Ethnic Conflict 
in the 21st Century), p. 232.  
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to solve the problem of asymmetry and regional relations in Russia, was essentially a 
simplified military bureaucracy.  This outcome was evident by the fact that two of the 
new presidential representatives were former commanders in the first Russo-Chechen 
war, while two others were former senior officials in the internal security apparatus.  
Putin further dismantled Yeltsin’s political legacy by forcing Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
and other autonomous republics to become fully integrated within the Russian federal 
constitutional and economic space, undoing the privileged status they had won from 
Yeltsin in 1994.  Moreover, Putin radically restructured the Federation Council, the upper 
house of parliament in August 2000, further consolidating power in the hands of the 
Kremlin.194 
Putin’s use of soft authoritarianism was not just limited to restricting the 
government.  He undertook several actions that demonstrated the extents of his 
willingness to exercise unilateral control.  For example, he limited the political capacities 
of several prominent oligarchs, demonstrated by the exile of billionaire businessman 
Boris Berezovskii in early 2000, and the “Yukos affair,” which resulted in the 
imprisonment of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii in May 2005.  Perhaps most 
significantly, he imposed centralization of the mass media.  Putin exerted compliance 
through key figures in the Kremlin, pressured self-censorship upon the oligarchic owners 
of media and journalists, closed down more objective media channels, and rigorously 
cracked down on print media that was critical of his administration.195  Such actions led to 
194 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 122. 
195 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 124. 
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a gross manipulation of the reporting of facts regarding Chechnya.  Famously, oligarch 
Vladimir Gusinskii’s NTV, National Television, media company, known for its critical 
coverage of the war in Chechnya, was transferred to state control via Gazprom, NTV’s 
main shareholder.  
Perhaps the most well-known case of media manipulation was that of the 
assassination of journalist Anna Politskovaya.  Politskovaya was a vocal critic of the 
Putin administration, particularly his policy regarding Chechnya.  While on a flight to 
Beslan to report on the SNO incident in 2004, she fell unconscious shortly after 
consuming tea on the plane.  Though the incident was not lethal, it was later discovered 
she had been poisoned.196  Politskovaya was subject to numerous death threats prior to 
her assassination.  Politskovaya herself, while attending a conference on freedom of the 
press in December of 2006 in Vienna, Austria, said: "People sometimes pay with their 
lives for saying aloud what they think. In fact, one can even get killed for giving me 
information. I am not the only one in danger. I have examples that prove it.”197  
Politskovaya, having given an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, just a 
week before her assassination spoke out against Kadyrov’s actions in Chechnya, calling 
him a “Stalin of our days.”198  She was found dead in the elevator of her apartment 
196 "Russian journalist reportedly poisoned en route to hostage negotiations". IFEX. 3 
September 2004. Retrieved 11 October 2006. 
197 "Trois journalistes tués le jour de l’inauguration à Bayeux du Mémorial des reporters'"
(in French). Reporters Without Borders. 7 October 2006. Archived from the original on 
29 October 2006. Retrieved 9 October 2006. 
198  Elena Riykovtseva, “Vetxiiy and noviy Ramzan,” Radio Svoboda. October 2006, New 
and Old Ramzan (Russian). 
78 
October 7, 2006.  Alexander Litvienko, Russian state security officer at the time, publicly 
named Putin as the culprit.  He was poisoned in November in that year with radioactive 
polonium.199 
Putin was nothing short of thorough in the elimination of his opposition and the 
consolidation of his power.  In waging war on Chechnya, Putin employed an 
unapologetic policy of dehumanizing and demonizing the Chechen insurgents.  Ignoring 
entirely the nationalist origins of the centuries-old conflict, Putin painted a picture of 
Chechnya as a “bandit enclave,” brimming with Wahhabist fundamentalists, who 
threatened not just lives, but the destabilization of the entire Northern Caucasus.200  
Basaev and his Islamic followers acted independently of the Maskhadov administration, 
and such radical insurgents comprised only a portion of the Chechen populace.  But 
although it existed only in “pockets of radicalism” scattered throughout Chechnya and the 
Caucasus, Islamism was nevertheless highly prevalent.  However, Putin’s propaganda 
machine succeeded, and the re-concentration of power in the hands of Moscow was 
impressive during his regime.  In 2000, Sergei Kovalev, a prominent human rights 
activist in Russia, argued that the relationship between the second Chechen War and the 
increasingly authoritarian government under Putin marked the “twilight of Russian 
freedom.”201  By 2006, Kovalev’s claim was cemented by the establishment of Putin’s 
presidential party United Russia.  Under United Russia, siloviki’s control over 
199  Alex Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko. Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of 
Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB. Free Press, New York, 2007, p. 328. 
200 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 111. 
201 Kovalev (2000), 8. 
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parliament, regional administrations, the elections, judicial apparatus, and media was 
realized.202 
Within the context of such an autocratic government and hardline President, 
Chechen Islamist attacks dance a fine line between “freedom fighting” and “Islamic 
terrorists.”  By all accounts, and as the historical record has made clear, as Putin’s regime 
has become emboldened, Chechen acts of terror became increasingly reactionary, and 
vice versa.  Indeed, the relationshp between Chechen insurgency and Putin’s 
counterinsurgency can be aptly described as having a mutualy reinforcing effect on each 
other.  What is clear is that Putin’s power plays in the Northern Caucasus have done little 
to quiet Chechen grievances, and have in fact exacerbated tension between Chechnya and 
Moscow.  Paradoxically, Dudaev’s and Maskhadov’s governments were initially driven 
by secular nationalism, and the Islamization which developed in Chechnya in the mid-
1990s came about not by the design of Chechen leaders, but mainly as a result of the 
radicalizing experience of military conflict with Russia from 1994 forward, directly 
attributable to Putin’s stringent counterinsurgency operations. 
A SCORCHED EARTH: PUTIN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS    
Authoritarian behavior also distinguished Putin’s counterinsurgency operations in 
Chechnya.  Putin’s policy was a marked departure from Yeltsin’s policy in dealing with 
202 Hughes, James P. Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad p. 124. 
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Chechen insurgents.  Rather than engaging in negotiations or diplomacy, Putin’s tactics 
focused on heavy bombardment.  The remains of the Chechen capital city of Grozny 
from the first war were essentially razed by sustained artillery and aerial bombardment 
ordered by Putin in December 1999.  As stated in Emma Gilligan’s Terror in Chechnya: 
Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War, “[This] second aerial assault ruined what 
was left of Grozny and rained bombs on some forty towns and villages from September 
1999 through February 2000.”203 Maskhadov was forced to call for a retreat, and Chechen 
forces dispersed into the highland mountains, and some were even forced to escape to the 
remote Pankisi Gorge in the neighboring country of Georgia.  The global jihadist network 
targeted Chechnya as a hub of terrorism.  If the first war had the characteristics of a 
guerrilla war, with regular engagements between military forces, the second war soon 
settled into a pattern that had more of the characteristics of a military insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, with terrorism and counterterrorism focused more on the civilian 
population. 
Major problems developed during the Chechen operations, largely a result of lack 
of proper Soviet training, and failed experiences in Afghanistan in the 1980s.  While 
special forces, spetsnaz, were deployed to hunt down Chechen insurgency leaders, much 
like the model employed by the American-born “war on terror,” Russian operations in 
Chechnya were inadequate.  They consisted of mostly contracted soldiers, and special 
203 Emma Gilligan. Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War. 
Princeton University Press: 2009. p.2
81 
paramilitary police units (OMON).204  However, many of the soldiers had little training, 
and were frequently under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or engaging in abuses of the 
Chechen civilian population.  The Russian decision to compensate for this, as well as 
“insure a victory over Chechnya,” by the use of unnecessary force and destruction in 
hindsight, was a strategic error on the part of the Russian forces.205  Because of such 
harsh measures, they suffered an ability to properly collect intelligence, and further 
alienated the Chechen population.  Consequently, this action only served to radicalize 
Chechen insurgent forces further, by this time having already adopted an Islamist 
fundamental platform as an instrumental aspect of their struggle. 
Russia recognized that at this point in the course of Russo-Chechen relations, it 
could no longer win over the hearts and minds of the Chechen populace, who had become 
resolute in their assertion to independence after a long history of oppression, and the 
influence of Islamic radicals who promised a victory over the Kremlin.  Negotiations had 
been tried and failed.  Putin’s course was one solely of coercion and control.  In pursuing 
this trajectory, Putin employed a tactic of what Hughes terms “Chechenization,” here 
meaning the cooption of Chechen defectors and persons of influence within Chechnya.206  
204 Hughes, James (2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and 
Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century) (p. 117). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle 
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Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century) (p. 117). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle 
Edition.  
206 Hughes, James (2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and 
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This process both inspired intra-national conflict between Chechens, who were now wary 
of who they could trust in their struggle for independence, and led to the establishment of 
the Kadyrov regime, which continues present-day.  A cursory evaluation of Putin’s 
process of Chechenization and the underpinnings of today’s Kadyrov presidency provide 
the final context to trace the path of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya, and evaluating its 
future implications. 
The Kadyrov regime is widely known as a proxy government, under the financial 
influence of Putin.207  The utilization of a proxy system, in this case the cooption of 
Chechen insurgents and leaders, has historically been a device used by imperialist powers 
to maintain their territories.  As political scientist Kalyvas explains, such measures divide 
and rule the resistance by sowing a form of covert, and often not so covert, civil war.208  
The Russians attempted to use such a plan, and fostered selective violence by relying on 
local agents.  As Kalyvas states, such reliance drives “a wedge within the native 
population.”209  This method of Chechenization, begun in the early 1990s, continues to 
color Putin’s policy regarding Chechnya today. Putin’s popularity and platform were 
dependent upon an effective end to the conflict in Chechnya, an integral part of which 
was maintaining Chechnya as Russian territory and the elimination of Islamic radicalism 
connected to Al-Qaeda.  Throughout the 1990s, Putin made use of a variety of so-called 
207 See Nicholas Waller, “A Chechen War By Proxy,” Foreign Affairs, April 1, 2015. 
208 Hughes, James (2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and 
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proxies, among them Zavgaev, and Avturkhanov.  Following the successful ouster of 
Maskhadov as president, Putin’s next task became finding a high profile person capable 
of winning over the Chechen constituency.  This task only became realizable when 
former Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov abandoned the insurgency in favor of stability, which he 
saw possible only through cooperation with Putin and the weight of the Russian forces.210 
Kadyrov may have been motivated by the potential for personal gains and the 
allure of power in Chechnya, impossible to achieve otherwise, but he was also a 
pragmatic man.  He recognized that many in Chechnya were already tired of fighting, 
unemployment reigned, the country desperately needed to be rebuilt, and the resonance of 
Islamism was not carried on the lips of every Chechen who died from Russian 
counterinsurgency measures.211  Putin’s scorched earth policy left no room for 
negotiations, and the disproportionate force Russia was willing to employ in ceasing 
Chechen separatist activity rendered any Chechen opposition futile.  In addition, 
increasing Wahhabi influence and supplies from Al-Qaeda had driven Kadyrov away 
from the resistance movement.212  Kadyrov, an open critic of Maskhadov, who he felt 
failed to effectively curb external Islamic radical influence during his term as president, 
was removed as Mufti in August of 1999.  Shortly after, he renounced the separatist 
210 Hughes, James (2013-03-01). Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (National and 
Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century) (p. 119). University of Pennsylvania Press. Kindle 
Edition.  
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212 These reasons for abandoning resistance to Russia were spelled out by Kadyrov in 
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wanted to “save my nation” and “root out” Wahhabism. Politkovskaia (2001), 192– 201, 
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cause and began speaking out against Wahhabi influence.  He was appointed by Putin in 
2000, just after Putin’s rise to power.  Putin now had an in-country collaborator, and pro-
Moscow Chechen administration willing to sacrifice the cause of independence, and 
combat the Islamic extremism that had penetrated the country. 
Current Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov, son of Akhmed Kadyrov, has done 
well to establish a relative stability in the Chechen nation.213  Since his rise to power, 
Kadyrov’s regime has undertaken a series of efforts at restructuring and rebuilding the 
Chechen economy.  For example, in March of 2006, Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov, chair 
of the Chechen People’s Assembly, stated that Kadyrov "has proven his capability to 
govern the economy, not only the power structures.”  Abdurakhmanov also remarked on 
how under Kadyrov, the Chechen government had already successfully reconstructed two 
large Grozny avenues, had repaired local roads, and was in the process of building new 
mosques, sports centers, and hospitals.214  However, despite the relative successes 
Kadyrov has been able to effect, stability and peace in Chechnya remains precarious.  
Insurgency from Islamic radicals continues to threaten destabilization and conflict in the 
region.215  Most Chechens are simply tired of fighting and are acceptant of his presidency, 
despite his close ties with President Putin.  However, Chechnya is still very much a hub 
of Islamism, and its connection to the global jihad network make it both a pressing 
concern, and difficult to combat 
213 http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Direction_For_Chechnya/1182441.html 
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Chapter 4 THE FUTURE OF CHECHEN JIHAD: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Tsarnaev brothers’ Patriots Day attack raised a host of questions.  Why was America 
suddenly the target of self-made Islamic radicals from Chechnya?  Were the Tsarnaev 
brothers in some way connected to Al Qaeda? The Tsarnaev brothers’ Boylston Street 
attack brought back to the forefront the issue of Islamism in Chechnya for the first time 
since the most recent Russo-Chechen peace accord. 
Chechnya came into contact with Russia beginning with Imperial Russia, during Tsarist 
campaigns into the Caucasus.  The Russians quickly learned that they were dealing with 
an impressive people, who possessed a distinct and multi-faceted identity.  Islam has 
historically comprised a fundamental aspect of this identity.  But it was only one of many 
identities endemic to the Vainakh peoples.  In the context of such a complex, and multi-
factored culture and nationality, Islam provided a means of unification.  Chechen political 
culture was often divided, and egalitarian in nature.  Initially, the banner of Islam was 
used as a rhetorical device in order to operationalize Chechen combatants against the 
Tsar.  
But during the Soviet period, the idea of a nation proper, in terms of statehood, began to 
take hold.  Simultaneously, incidents such as the mass deportation of the Chechen people, 
contributed to growing anti-Russian sentiment, and helped form the backbone to a 
determinist interpretation of Russo-Chechen history.  Chechens began to see themselves 
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as the perpetually oppressed, and Russia the oppressor.  While this historical logic is 
parsimonious in its understanding,216 ultimately, the Chechen separatist rhetoric proved 
powerful, and their nationalist movement could not be quelled.  Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Chechens were presented with a window to realize their 
independence. 
The political vacuum left by the Soviet Union was seized upon by the Chechens.  But 
rather than a cogent state, it resulted in a failed attempt at state-formation.  This led to a 
condition of instability and volatility.  Following this failed experiment at nation-
building, General Dudaev came to power, and facilitated the advent of Islamic radicalism 
in Chechnya.  Shortly afterward, ties to the global jihad network were established, and 
Islamism in Chechnya became a tenacious and sobering issue.  
The future of Chechen jihad is likely to be a complex one.  As we have discussed, in 
combatting Muslim radicalism, Putin has used unnecessarily harsh measures and instilled 
an autocratic regime predicated on the need for a hardline against the “global war on 
terror.”  However, Islamic insurgency continues to be a pressing issue in the region.  And 
while anti-Russian sentiment remains resonant among Chechens, the current state of 
affairs had led many to advance ideas of cooperation and compromise with the Russian 
bear.  Putin’s use of soft authoritarianism and power plays in the Northern Caucasus will 
216 There were incidents of Russo-Chechen cooperation and collaboration throughout the 
history of Russo-Chechen relations 
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likely be the critical juncture, around which the future of Chechen nationalism, as well as 
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